Commit 'virtio: validate config_len on load' restricted config_len
loaded from the wire to match the config_len that the device had.
Unfortunately, there are cases where this isn't true, the one
we found it on was the wce addition in virtio-blk.
Allow mismatched config-lengths:
*) If the version on the wire is shorter then fine
*) If the version on the wire is longer, load what we have space
for and skip the rest.
(This is mst@redhat.com's rework of what I originally posted)
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2f5732e964)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In function do_pci_register_device() in file hw/pci/pci.c, move the assignment
of pci_dev->devfn to the position before the call to
pci_device_iommu_address_space(pci_dev) which will use the value of
pci_dev->devfn.
Fixes: 9eda7d373e
pci: Introduce helper to retrieve a PCI device's DMA address space
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Le Tan <tamlokveer@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit efc8188e93)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Replace qemu_allocate_irqs(foo, bar, 1)[0]
with qemu_allocate_irq(foo, bar, 0).
This avoids leaking the dereferenced qemu_irq *.
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Crosthwaite <peter.crosthwaite@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
[PC Changes:
* Applied change to instance in sh4/sh7750.c
]
Signed-off-by: Peter Crosthwaite <peter.crosthwaite@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Batuzov <batuzovk@ispras.ru>
[AF: Fix IRQ index in sh4/sh7750.c]
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit f3c7d0389f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
It does a g_free() on the pointer, so don't pass a local &foo reference.
Reviewed-by: Peter Crosthwaite <peter.crosthwaite@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit 127a4e1a51)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The device configuration is set at realize time and never changes. It
should not be migrated as it is done today. For the sake of compatibility,
let's just skip them at load time.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
[ added missing casts to uint16_t *,
added From, SoB and commit message,
Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com> ]
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e38e943a1f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
TCP connectivity fails when the guest has a different endianness.
The packets are silently dropped on the host by the tap backend
when they are read from user space because the endianness of the
virtio-net header is in the wrong order. These lines may appear
in the guest console:
[ 454.709327] skbuff: bad partial csum: csum=8704/4096 len=74
[ 455.702554] skbuff: bad partial csum: csum=8704/4096 len=74
The issue that got first spotted with a ppc64le PowerKVM guest,
but it also exists for the less common case of a x86_64 guest run
by a big-endian ppc64 TCG hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
[ Ported from PowerKVM,
Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com> ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 032a74a1c0)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Due to an incomplete initialization, adding a usb-bt-dongle device through HMP
or QMP will cause a segmentation fault.
Signed-off-by: Hani Benhabiles <hani@linux.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c340a284f3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
vhost_verify_ring_mappings leaks mappings on error.
Fix this up.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8617343faa)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch fixes a bug in scsi_block_new_request() that was introduced
by commit 137745c5c6. If the host cache
is used - i.e. if BDRV_O_NOCACHE is _not_ set - the 'break' statement
needs to be executed to 'fall back' to SG_IO.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2fe5a9f73b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
We should not try to store the emw portion of the irb if extended
measurements are not applicable. In particular, we should not surprise
the guest by storing a larger irb if it did not enable extended
measurements.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit f068d320de)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91e7fcca47)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
It's a loop from i < num_sg and the array is VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE - so
it's OK if the value read is VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.
Not a big problem in practice as people don't use
such big queues, but it's inelegant.
Reported-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9372514080)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
KVM only supports MSIX table size up to 256 vectors,
but some assigned devices support more vectors,
at the moment attempts to assign them fail with EINVAL.
Tweak the MSIX capability exposed to guest to limit table size
to a supported value.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 639973a474)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Current guest kernels try allocating as many vectors as the quota is.
For example, in the case of virtio-net (which has just 3 vectors)
the guest requests 4 vectors (that is the quota in the test) and
the existing ibm,change-msi handler returns 4. But before it returns,
it calls msix_set_message() in a loop and corrupts memory behind
the end of msix_table.
This limits the number of vectors returned by ibm,change-msi to
the maximum supported by the actual device.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
[agraf: squash in bugfix from aik]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit b26696b519)
*s/error_report/fprintf/ to reflect v1.7.x error reporting style
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Incoming migration with stellaris_enet is unsafe.
It's being reworked, but for now, simply block it
since noone is using it anyway.
Block outgoing migration for good measure.
CVE-2013-4532
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Malformed input can have config_len in migration stream
exceed the array size allocated on destination, the
result will be heap overflow.
To fix, that config_len matches on both sides.
CVE-2014-0182
Reported-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
--
v2: use %ix and %zx to print config_len values
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a890a2f913)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4541
s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
this to load arbitrary data.
setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
they are not negative.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9f8e9895c5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
As the macro verifies the value is positive, rename it
to make the function clearer.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3476436a44)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4542
hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c invokes load_request.
virtio_scsi_load_request does:
qemu_get_buffer(f, (unsigned char *)&req->elem, sizeof(req->elem));
this probably can make elem invalid, for example,
make in_num or out_num huge, then:
virtio_scsi_parse_req(s, vs->cmd_vqs[n], req);
will do:
if (req->elem.out_num > 1) {
qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.out_sg[1],
&req->elem.out_addr[1],
req->elem.out_num - 1);
} else {
qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.in_sg[1],
&req->elem.in_addr[1],
req->elem.in_num - 1);
}
and this will access out of array bounds.
Note: this adds security checks within assert calls since
SCSIBusInfo's load_request cannot fail.
For now simply disable builds with NDEBUG - there seems
to be little value in supporting these.
Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3c3ce98142)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4540
Within scoop_gpio_handler_update, if prev_level has a high bit set, then
we get bit > 16 and that causes a buffer overrun.
Since prev_level comes from wire indirectly, this can
happen on invalid state load.
Similarly for gpio_level and gpio_dir.
To fix, limit to 16 bit.
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 52f91c3723)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4539
s->precision, nextprecision, function and nextfunction
come from wire and are used
as idx into resolution[] in TSC_CUT_RESOLUTION.
Validate after load to avoid buffer overrun.
Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5193be3be3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4538
s->cmd_len used as index in ssd0323_transfer() to store 32-bit field.
Possible this field might then be supplied by guest to overwrite a
return addr somewhere. Same for row/col fields, which are indicies into
framebuffer array.
To fix validate after load.
Additionally, validate that the row/col_start/end are within bounds;
otherwise the guest can provoke an overrun by either setting the _end
field so large that the row++ increments just walk off the end of the
array, or by setting the _start value to something bogus and then
letting the "we hit end of row" logic reset row to row_start.
For completeness, validate mode as well.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ead7a57df3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4537
s->arglen is taken from wire and used as idx
in ssi_sd_transfer().
Validate it before access.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a9c380db3b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4533
s->rx_level is read from the wire and used to determine how many bytes
to subsequently read into s->rx_fifo[]. If s->rx_level exceeds the
length of s->rx_fifo[] the buffer can be overrun with arbitrary data
from the wire.
Fix this by validating rx_level against the size of s->rx_fifo.
Cc: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com>
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit caa881abe0)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4535
CVE-2013-4536
Both virtio-block and virtio-serial read,
VirtQueueElements are read in as buffers, and passed to
virtqueue_map_sg(), where num_sg is taken from the wire and can force
writes to indicies beyond VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.
To fix, validate num_sg.
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 36cf2a3713)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4534
opp->nb_cpus is read from the wire and used to determine how many
IRQDest elements to read into opp->dst[]. If the value exceeds the
length of opp->dst[], MAX_CPU, opp->dst[] can be overrun with arbitrary
data from the wire.
Fix this by failing migration if the value read from the wire exceeds
MAX_CPU.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73d963c0a7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-6399
vdev->queue_sel is read from the wire, and later used in the
emulation code as an index into vdev->vq[]. If the value of
vdev->queue_sel exceeds the length of vdev->vq[], currently
allocated to be VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX elements, subsequent PIO
operations such as VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_PFN can be used to overrun
the buffer with arbitrary data originating from the source.
Fix this by failing migration if the value from the wire exceeds
VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4b53c2c72c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4530
pl022.c did not bounds check tx_fifo_head and
rx_fifo_head after loading them from file and
before they are used to dereference array.
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d8d0a0bc7e)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
4) CVE-2013-4529
hw/pci/pcie_aer.c pcie aer log can overrun the buffer if log_num is
too large
There are two issues in this file:
1. log_max from remote can be larger than on local
then buffer will overrun with data coming from state file.
2. log_num can be larger then we get data corruption
again with an overflow but not adversary controlled.
Fix both issues.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5f691ff91d)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4527 hw/timer/hpet.c buffer overrun
hpet is a VARRAY with a uint8 size but static array of 32
To fix, make sure num_timers is valid using VMSTATE_VALID hook.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3f1c49e213)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4526
Within hw/ide/ahci.c, VARRAY refers to ports which is also loaded. So
we use the old version of ports to read the array but then allow any
value for ports. This can cause the code to overflow.
There's no reason to migrate ports - it never changes.
So just make sure it matches.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae2158ad6c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4151 QEMU 1.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_load@hw/virtio/virtio.c
So we have this code since way back when:
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
array of vqs has size VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX, so
on invalid input this will write beyond end of buffer.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit cc45995294)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4149 QEMU 1.3.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c
> } else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
> uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
We are allocating buffer of size n->mac_table.in_use
> qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
and read to the n->mac_table.in_use size buffer n->mac_table.in_use *
ETH_ALEN bytes, corrupting memory.
If adversary controls state then memory written there is controlled
by adversary.
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 98f93ddd84)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4150 QEMU 1.5.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c
This code is in hw/net/virtio-net.c:
if (n->max_queues > 1) {
if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
return -1;
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
}
Number of vqs is max_queues, so if we get invalid input here,
for example if max_queues = 2, curr_queues = 3, we get
write beyond end of the buffer, with data that comes from
wire.
This might be used to corrupt qemu memory in hard to predict ways.
Since we have lots of function pointers around, RCE might be possible.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit eea750a562)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4544
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1396604722-11902-5-git-send-email-dmitry@daynix.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit f12d048a52)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CVE-2013-4544
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1396604722-11902-4-git-send-email-dmitry@daynix.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c99afc779)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
espes