mirror of https://github.com/xemu-project/xemu.git
![]() A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be very helpful. Changes since v8: * Rebase * Fixed some cosmetic typos Changes since v7: * Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag * Polished the interface to the PEF internals * Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be) Changes since v6: * Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros * Assorted minor fixes Changes since v5: * Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest support" * Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption * Added a bunch of documentation * Fixed some compile errors on POWER Changes since v4: * Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory", which I think is marginally more descriptive * Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at kvm_init didn't work for s390 * Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing (gitlab CI) only Changes since v3: * Rebased * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization Changes since RFCv2: * Rebased * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged) * Changed name to "host trust limitation" * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version) Changes since RFCv1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEdfRlhq5hpmzETofcbDjKyiDZs5IFAmAg1R8ACgkQbDjKyiDZ s5KCVRAAgm/xlgEv2hDZ7z+MuOTNesCpR3uU4iX02xNktox96Qai7XlrA7bhDf1v y/0FLnOOL6Kn5OHeS2CiDPIgWIUfapSwDsTPooZ6GqfzCI+r0jIaSBu59IBhvJRh o3ZTfT2fsckY9Gy2YN29ssN87ovDTPNlvRAxGH/71mMKEGJcK6QWxGcsyJDmeKq4 0/tOQaLMFRRagTpwqCT1eacMzyQwkoDcywQHfi0Is+Q4voWPKgDY0qPqLd1OG2XI cMQ8fagums3NkPpVbKAW7sIvDiHtH1HNDoHKTiwKtTUsN5LBz+LN87LoKAdBasV0 AiRm8gi+CkF/NOA2RjwaFmThxt7sr8kTKVuIqTo5m8agqkhJr97+gBxUym49CxTx 1Zjo9TWsprKXnXl8vfGtAIZ4pkYQzomMDT3AilEST3+zbpRuwTMGOJ5vLF7RrKtF AtF2XBiPGZ/NztpbmaukuG/R49wwW5we4dR1zySMcoTsAl1rIzxpfwBnYatOY0Hg sVc9gABwQ0kacsseVIX72c+30U02cR8f6uRfuqNAEUW13vdAo/5/PXxGVlevMkw5 33MYr16CkGnYgtgJtORK+x8/vPlAYiBzZrn71Wym7yKCamf8LMbzPNXKjUaD/GT8 TZG7abTV8vuS0m7V/hGgV8nTVaG/6VLEyAtO6YpjQ+1p+dO8xBc= =TTeT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request' into staging Generalize memory encryption models A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be very helpful. Changes since v8: * Rebase * Fixed some cosmetic typos Changes since v7: * Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag * Polished the interface to the PEF internals * Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be) Changes since v6: * Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros * Assorted minor fixes Changes since v5: * Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest support" * Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption * Added a bunch of documentation * Fixed some compile errors on POWER Changes since v4: * Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory", which I think is marginally more descriptive * Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at kvm_init didn't work for s390 * Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing (gitlab CI) only Changes since v3: * Rebased * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization Changes since RFCv2: * Rebased * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged) * Changed name to "host trust limitation" * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version) Changes since RFCv1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert # gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 06:07:27 GMT # gpg: using RSA key 75F46586AE61A66CC44E87DC6C38CACA20D9B392 # gpg: Good signature from "David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>" [full] # gpg: aka "David Gibson (Red Hat) <dgibson@redhat.com>" [full] # gpg: aka "David Gibson (ozlabs.org) <dgibson@ozlabs.org>" [full] # gpg: aka "David Gibson (kernel.org) <dwg@kernel.org>" [unknown] # Primary key fingerprint: 75F4 6586 AE61 A66C C44E 87DC 6C38 CACA 20D9 B392 * remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request: s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests spapr: PEF: prevent migration spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support confidential guest support: Update documentation confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class qom: Allow optional sugar props Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> |
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accel | ||
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capstone@f8b1b83301 | ||
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contrib | ||
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default-configs | ||
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docs | ||
dtc@85e5d83984 | ||
dump | ||
fpu | ||
fsdev | ||
gdb-xml | ||
hw | ||
include | ||
io | ||
libdecnumber | ||
linux-headers | ||
linux-user | ||
meson@776acd2a80 | ||
migration | ||
monitor | ||
nbd | ||
net | ||
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roms | ||
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storage-daemon | ||
stubs | ||
subprojects/libvhost-user | ||
target | ||
tcg | ||
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tools | ||
trace | ||
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CODING_STYLE.rst | ||
COPYING | ||
COPYING.LIB | ||
Kconfig | ||
Kconfig.host | ||
LICENSE | ||
MAINTAINERS | ||
Makefile | ||
README.rst | ||
VERSION | ||
block.c | ||
blockdev-nbd.c | ||
blockdev.c | ||
blockjob.c | ||
configure | ||
cpu.c | ||
cpus-common.c | ||
disas.c | ||
exec-vary.c | ||
gdbstub.c | ||
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hmp-commands-info.hx | ||
hmp-commands.hx | ||
iothread.c | ||
job-qmp.c | ||
job.c | ||
memory_ldst.c.inc | ||
meson.build | ||
meson_options.txt | ||
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os-win32.c | ||
qemu-bridge-helper.c | ||
qemu-edid.c | ||
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version.rc |
README.rst
=========== QEMU README =========== QEMU is a generic and open source machine & userspace emulator and virtualizer. QEMU is capable of emulating a complete machine in software without any need for hardware virtualization support. By using dynamic translation, it achieves very good performance. QEMU can also integrate with the Xen and KVM hypervisors to provide emulated hardware while allowing the hypervisor to manage the CPU. With hypervisor support, QEMU can achieve near native performance for CPUs. When QEMU emulates CPUs directly it is capable of running operating systems made for one machine (e.g. an ARMv7 board) on a different machine (e.g. an x86_64 PC board). QEMU is also capable of providing userspace API virtualization for Linux and BSD kernel interfaces. This allows binaries compiled against one architecture ABI (e.g. the Linux PPC64 ABI) to be run on a host using a different architecture ABI (e.g. the Linux x86_64 ABI). This does not involve any hardware emulation, simply CPU and syscall emulation. QEMU aims to fit into a variety of use cases. It can be invoked directly by users wishing to have full control over its behaviour and settings. It also aims to facilitate integration into higher level management layers, by providing a stable command line interface and monitor API. It is commonly invoked indirectly via the libvirt library when using open source applications such as oVirt, OpenStack and virt-manager. QEMU as a whole is released under the GNU General Public License, version 2. For full licensing details, consult the LICENSE file. Building ======== QEMU is multi-platform software intended to be buildable on all modern Linux platforms, OS-X, Win32 (via the Mingw64 toolchain) and a variety of other UNIX targets. The simple steps to build QEMU are: .. code-block:: shell mkdir build cd build ../configure make Additional information can also be found online via the QEMU website: * `<https://qemu.org/Hosts/Linux>`_ * `<https://qemu.org/Hosts/Mac>`_ * `<https://qemu.org/Hosts/W32>`_ Submitting patches ================== The QEMU source code is maintained under the GIT version control system. .. code-block:: shell git clone https://git.qemu.org/git/qemu.git When submitting patches, one common approach is to use 'git format-patch' and/or 'git send-email' to format & send the mail to the qemu-devel@nongnu.org mailing list. All patches submitted must contain a 'Signed-off-by' line from the author. Patches should follow the guidelines set out in the CODING_STYLE.rst file. Additional information on submitting patches can be found online via the QEMU website * `<https://qemu.org/Contribute/SubmitAPatch>`_ * `<https://qemu.org/Contribute/TrivialPatches>`_ The QEMU website is also maintained under source control. .. code-block:: shell git clone https://git.qemu.org/git/qemu-web.git * `<https://www.qemu.org/2017/02/04/the-new-qemu-website-is-up/>`_ A 'git-publish' utility was created to make above process less cumbersome, and is highly recommended for making regular contributions, or even just for sending consecutive patch series revisions. It also requires a working 'git send-email' setup, and by default doesn't automate everything, so you may want to go through the above steps manually for once. For installation instructions, please go to * `<https://github.com/stefanha/git-publish>`_ The workflow with 'git-publish' is: .. code-block:: shell $ git checkout master -b my-feature $ # work on new commits, add your 'Signed-off-by' lines to each $ git publish Your patch series will be sent and tagged as my-feature-v1 if you need to refer back to it in the future. Sending v2: .. code-block:: shell $ git checkout my-feature # same topic branch $ # making changes to the commits (using 'git rebase', for example) $ git publish Your patch series will be sent with 'v2' tag in the subject and the git tip will be tagged as my-feature-v2. Bug reporting ============= The QEMU project uses Launchpad as its primary upstream bug tracker. Bugs found when running code built from QEMU git or upstream released sources should be reported via: * `<https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/>`_ If using QEMU via an operating system vendor pre-built binary package, it is preferable to report bugs to the vendor's own bug tracker first. If the bug is also known to affect latest upstream code, it can also be reported via launchpad. For additional information on bug reporting consult: * `<https://qemu.org/Contribute/ReportABug>`_ ChangeLog ========= For version history and release notes, please visit `<https://wiki.qemu.org/ChangeLog/>`_ or look at the git history for more detailed information. Contact ======= The QEMU community can be contacted in a number of ways, with the two main methods being email and IRC * `<mailto:qemu-devel@nongnu.org>`_ * `<https://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/qemu-devel>`_ * #qemu on irc.oftc.net Information on additional methods of contacting the community can be found online via the QEMU website: * `<https://qemu.org/Contribute/StartHere>`_