In SNP, the hashes page designated with a specific metadata entry
published in AmdSev OVMF.
Therefore, if the user enabled kernel hashes (for measured direct boot),
QEMU should prepare the content of hashes table, and during the
processing of the metadata entry it copy the content into the designated
page and encrypt it.
Note that in SNP (unlike SEV and SEV-ES) the measurements is done in
whole 4KB pages. Therefore QEMU zeros the whole page that includes the
hashes table, and fills in the kernel hashes area in that page, and then
encrypts the whole page. The rest of the page is reserved for SEV
launch secrets which are not usable anyway on SNP.
If the user disabled kernel hashes, QEMU pre-validates the kernel hashes
page as a zero page.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-24-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move the declaration of PaddedSevHashTable before SevSnpGuest so
we can add a new such field to the latter.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-23-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Extract the building of the kernel hashes table out from
sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes() to allow building it in
other memory areas (for SNP support).
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-22-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM will forward GHCB page-state change requests to userspace in the
form of KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, so make sure the hypercall handling is
enabled for SNP guests.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-32-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE will be used to send requests to userspace for
private/shared memory attribute updates requested by the guest.
Implement handling for that use-case along with some basic
infrastructure for enabling specific hypercall events.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-31-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Invoke as sev_snp_launch_update_data() for SNP object.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-27-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add launch_update_data() in SevCommonStateClass and
invoke as sev_launch_update_data() for SEV object.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-26-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
As with SEV, an SNP guest requires that the BIOS be part of the initial
encrypted/measured guest payload. Extend sev_encrypt_flash() to handle
the SNP case and plumb through the GPA of the BIOS location since this
is needed for SNP.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-25-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-SNP firmware allows a special guest page to be populated with a
table of guest CPUID values so that they can be validated through
firmware before being loaded into encrypted guest memory where they can
be used in place of hypervisor-provided values[1].
As part of SEV-SNP guest initialization, use this interface to validate
the CPUID entries reported by KVM_GET_CPUID2 prior to initial guest
start and populate the CPUID page reserved by OVMF with the resulting
encrypted data.
[1] SEV SNP Firmware ABI Specification, Rev. 0.8, 8.13.2.6
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-21-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
OVMF reserves various pages so they can be pre-initialized/validated
prior to launching the guest. Add support for populating these pages
with the expected content.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-20-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
A recent version of OVMF expanded the reset vector GUID list to add
SEV-specific metadata GUID. The SEV metadata describes the reserved
memory regions such as the secrets and CPUID page used during the SEV-SNP
guest launch.
The pc_system_get_ovmf_sev_metadata_ptr() is used to retieve the SEV
metadata pointer from the OVMF GUID list.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-19-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Once KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH is called the vCPU state is copied into the
vCPU's VMSA page and measured/encrypted. Any attempt to read/write CPU
state afterward will only be acting on the initial data and so are
effectively no-ops.
Set the vCPU state to protected at this point so that QEMU don't
continue trying to re-sync vCPU data during guest runtime.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-18-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Process any queued up launch data and encrypt/measure it into the SNP
guest instance prior to initial guest launch.
This also updates the KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE call to handle partial
update responses.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-17-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SNP_LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch
context within the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-16-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Most of the current 'query-sev' command is relevant to both legacy
SEV/SEV-ES guests and SEV-SNP guests, with 2 exceptions:
- 'policy' is a 64-bit field for SEV-SNP, not 32-bit, and
the meaning of the bit positions has changed
- 'handle' is not relevant to SEV-SNP
To address this, this patch adds a new 'sev-type' field that can be
used as a discriminator to select between SEV and SEV-SNP-specific
fields/formats without breaking compatibility for existing management
tools (so long as management tools that add support for launching
SEV-SNP guest update their handling of query-sev appropriately).
The corresponding HMP command has also been fixed up similarly.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by:Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-15-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV guests can use either KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM, KVM_X86_SEV_VM,
or KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM depending on the configuration and what
the host kernel supports. SNP guests on the other hand can only
ever use KVM_X86_SNP_VM, so split determination of VM type out
into a separate class method that can be set accordingly for
sev-guest vs. sev-snp-guest objects and add handling for SNP.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-14-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
[Remove unnecessary function pointer declaration. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-SNP guests, launch measurement is queried from within the guest
during attestation, so don't attempt to return it as part of
query-sev-launch-measure.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-13-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SNP guests will rely on this bit to determine certain feature support.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-12-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SNP does not support SMM and requires guest_memfd for
private guest memory, so add SNP specific kvm_init()
functionality in snp_kvm_init() class method.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-11-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Some aspects of the init routine SEV are specific to SEV and not
applicable for SNP guests, so move the SEV-specific bits into
separate class method and retain only the common functionality.
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-10-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a simple helper to check if the current guest type is SNP. Also have
SNP-enabled imply that SEV-ES is enabled as well, and fix up any places
where the sev_es_enabled() check is expecting a pure/non-SNP guest.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-9-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-SNP support relies on a different set of properties/state than the
existing 'sev-guest' object. This patch introduces the 'sev-snp-guest'
object, which can be used to configure an SEV-SNP guest. For example,
a default-configured SEV-SNP guest with no additional information
passed in for use with attestation:
-object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0
or a fully-specified SEV-SNP guest where all spec-defined binary
blobs are passed in as base64-encoded strings:
-object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0, \
policy=0x30000, \
init-flags=0, \
id-block=YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg==, \
id-auth=CxHK/OKLkXGn/KpAC7Wl1FSiisWDbGTEKz..., \
author-key-enabled=on, \
host-data=LNkCWBRC5CcdGXirbNUV1OrsR28s..., \
guest-visible-workarounds=AA==, \
See the QAPI schema updates included in this patch for more usage
details.
In some cases these blobs may be up to 4096 characters, but this is
generally well below the default limit for linux hosts where
command-line sizes are defined by the sysconf-configurable ARG_MAX
value, which defaults to 2097152 characters for Ubuntu hosts, for
example.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> (for QAPI schema)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-8-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When sev-snp-guest objects are introduced there will be a number of
differences in how the launch finish is handled compared to the existing
sev-guest object. Move sev_launch_finish() to a class method to make it
easier to implement SNP-specific launch update functionality later.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-7-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When sev-snp-guest objects are introduced there will be a number of
differences in how the launch data is handled compared to the existing
sev-guest object. Move sev_launch_start() to a class method to make it
easier to implement SNP-specific launch update functionality later.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-6-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently all SEV/SEV-ES functionality is managed through a single
'sev-guest' QOM type. With upcoming support for SEV-SNP, taking this
same approach won't work well since some of the properties/state
managed by 'sev-guest' is not applicable to SEV-SNP, which will instead
rely on a new QOM type with its own set of properties/state.
To prepare for this, this patch moves common state into an abstract
'sev-common' parent type to encapsulate properties/state that are
common to both SEV/SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, leaving only SEV/SEV-ES-specific
properties/state in the current 'sev-guest' type. This should not
affect current behavior or command-line options.
As part of this patch, some related changes are also made:
- a static 'sev_guest' variable is currently used to keep track of
the 'sev-guest' instance. SEV-SNP would similarly introduce an
'sev_snp_guest' static variable. But these instances are now
available via qdev_get_machine()->cgs, so switch to using that
instead and drop the static variable.
- 'sev_guest' is currently used as the name for the static variable
holding a pointer to the 'sev-guest' instance. Re-purpose the name
as a local variable referring the 'sev-guest' instance, and use
that consistently throughout the code so it can be easily
distinguished from sev-common/sev-snp-guest instances.
- 'sev' is generally used as the name for local variables holding a
pointer to the 'sev-guest' instance. In cases where that now points
to common state, use the name 'sev_common'; in cases where that now
points to state specific to 'sev-guest' instance, use the name
'sev_guest'
In order to enable kernel-hashes for SNP, pull it from
SevGuestProperties to its parent SevCommonProperties so
it will be available for both SEV and SNP.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> (QAPI schema)
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-5-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
xsave.flat checks that "executing the XSETBV instruction causes a general-
protection fault (#GP) if ECX = 0 and EAX[2:1] has the value 10b". QEMU allows
that option, so the test fails. Add the condition.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 892544317f ("target/i386: implement XSAVE and XRSTOR of AVX registers", 2022-10-18)
Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
DisasContext.cpuid_ext_features indicates CPUID.01H.ECX.
Use DisasContext.cpuid_7_0_ecx_features field to check RDPID feature bit
(CPUID_7_0_ECX_RDPID).
Fixes: 6750485bf4 ("target/i386: implement RDPID in TCG")
Inspired-by: Xinyu Li <lixinyu20s@ict.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240603080723.1256662-1-zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This commit fixes an issue with MOV instructions (0x8C and 0x8E)
involving segment registers; MOV to segment register's source is
16-bit, while MOV from segment register has to explicitly set the
memory operand size to 16 bits. Introduce a new flag
X86_SPECIAL_Op0_Mw to handle this specification correctly.
Signed-off-by: Xinyu Li <lixinyu20s@ict.ac.cn>
Message-ID: <20240602100528.2135717-1-lixinyu20s@ict.ac.cn>
Fixes: 5e9e21bcc4 ("target/i386: move 60-BF opcodes to new decoder", 2024-05-07)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Features check of CPUID_SSE and CPUID_SSE2 should use cpuid_features,
rather than cpuid_ext_features.
Signed-off-by: Xinyu Li <lixinyu20s@ict.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240602100904.2137939-1-lixinyu20s@ict.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
FEAT_WFxT introduces new instructions WFIT and WFET, which are like
the existing WFI and WFE but allow the guest to pass a timeout value
in a register. The instructions will wait for an interrupt/event as
usual, but will also stop waiting when the value of CNTVCT_EL0 is
greater than or equal to the specified timeout value.
We implement WFIT by setting up a timer to expire at the right
point; when the timer expires it sets the EXITTB interrupt, which
will cause the CPU to leave the halted state. If we come out of
halt for some other reason, we unset the pending timer.
We implement WFET as a nop, which is architecturally permitted and
matches the way we currently make WFE a nop.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240430140035.3889879-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org
The TCGCPUOps::cpu_exec_halt method is called from cpu_handle_halt()
when the CPU is halted, so that a target CPU emulation can do
anything target-specific it needs to do. (At the moment we only use
this on i386.)
The current specification of the method doesn't allow the target
specific code to do something different if the CPU is about to come
out of the halt state, because cpu_handle_halt() only determines this
after the method has returned. (If the method called cpu_has_work()
itself this would introduce a potential race if an interrupt arrived
between the target's method implementation checking and
cpu_handle_halt() repeating the check.)
Change the definition of the method so that it returns a bool to
tell cpu_handle_halt() whether to stay in halt or not.
We will want this for the Arm target, where FEAT_WFxT wants to do
some work only for the case where the CPU is in halt but about to
leave it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240430140035.3889879-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-34-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
These are the only instructions in the 3 source scalar class.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-33-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
These are the last instructions within disas_simd_three_reg_same
and disas_simd_scalar_three_reg_same, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-32-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
We already have a gvec helper for the operations, but we aren't
using it on the aa32 neon side. Create a unified expander for
use by both aa32 and aa64 translators.
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-31-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-30-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-29-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-28-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-27-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-26-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-25-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240528203044.612851-24-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
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