qga-pull-2024-05-01

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Merge tag 'qga-pull-2024-05-01' of https://github.com/kostyanf14/qemu into staging

qga-pull-2024-05-01

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# gpg: Signature made Wed 01 May 2024 12:40:40 AM PDT
# gpg:                using RSA key C2C2C109EA43C63C1423EB84EF5D5E8161BA84E7
# gpg: Good signature from "Kostiantyn Kostiuk (Upstream PR sign) <kkostiuk@redhat.com>" [unknown]
# gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
# gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
# Primary key fingerprint: C2C2 C109 EA43 C63C 1423  EB84 EF5D 5E81 61BA 84E7

* tag 'qga-pull-2024-05-01' of https://github.com/kostyanf14/qemu:
  qga: Implement SSH commands for Windows
  qga: Refactor common SSH functions
  qga/commands-posix: qmp_guest_set_user_password: use ga_run_command helper
  qga/commands-posix: don't do fork()/exec() when suspending via sysfs
  qga/commands-posix: execute_fsfreeze_hook: use ga_run_command helper
  qga/commands-posix: qmp_guest_set_time: use ga_run_command helper
  qga/commands-posix: qmp_guest_shutdown: use ga_run_command helper
  qga: introduce ga_run_command() helper for guest cmd execution
  qga: guest-get-fsinfo: add optional 'total-bytes-privileged' field

Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Richard Henderson 2024-05-01 06:49:03 -07:00
commit d5a8f0b200
9 changed files with 999 additions and 283 deletions

50
qga/commands-common-ssh.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
/*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
* See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*/
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "commands-common-ssh.h"
GStrv read_authkeys(const char *path, Error **errp)
{
g_autoptr(GError) err = NULL;
g_autofree char *contents = NULL;
if (!g_file_get_contents(path, &contents, NULL, &err)) {
error_setg(errp, "failed to read '%s': %s", path, err->message);
return NULL;
}
return g_strsplit(contents, "\n", -1);
}
bool check_openssh_pub_keys(strList *keys, size_t *nkeys, Error **errp)
{
size_t n = 0;
strList *k;
for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
if (!check_openssh_pub_key(k->value, errp)) {
return false;
}
n++;
}
if (nkeys) {
*nkeys = n;
}
return true;
}
bool check_openssh_pub_key(const char *key, Error **errp)
{
/* simple sanity-check, we may want more? */
if (!key || key[0] == '#' || strchr(key, '\n')) {
error_setg(errp, "invalid OpenSSH public key: '%s'", key);
return false;
}
return true;
}

10
qga/commands-common-ssh.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
/*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
* See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*/
#include "qapi/qapi-builtin-types.h"
GStrv read_authkeys(const char *path, Error **errp);
bool check_openssh_pub_keys(strList *keys, size_t *nkeys, Error **errp);
bool check_openssh_pub_key(const char *key, Error **errp);

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <locale.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include "commands-common-ssh.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "qga-qapi-commands.h"
@ -80,37 +81,6 @@ mkdir_for_user(const char *path, const struct passwd *p,
return true;
}
static bool
check_openssh_pub_key(const char *key, Error **errp)
{
/* simple sanity-check, we may want more? */
if (!key || key[0] == '#' || strchr(key, '\n')) {
error_setg(errp, "invalid OpenSSH public key: '%s'", key);
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool
check_openssh_pub_keys(strList *keys, size_t *nkeys, Error **errp)
{
size_t n = 0;
strList *k;
for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
if (!check_openssh_pub_key(k->value, errp)) {
return false;
}
n++;
}
if (nkeys) {
*nkeys = n;
}
return true;
}
static bool
write_authkeys(const char *path, const GStrv keys,
const struct passwd *p, Error **errp)
@ -139,21 +109,6 @@ write_authkeys(const char *path, const GStrv keys,
return true;
}
static GStrv
read_authkeys(const char *path, Error **errp)
{
g_autoptr(GError) err = NULL;
g_autofree char *contents = NULL;
if (!g_file_get_contents(path, &contents, NULL, &err)) {
error_setg(errp, "failed to read '%s': %s", path, err->message);
return NULL;
}
return g_strsplit(contents, "\n", -1);
}
void
qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
bool has_reset, bool reset,

View File

@ -76,12 +76,159 @@ static void ga_wait_child(pid_t pid, int *status, Error **errp)
g_assert(rpid == pid);
}
static ssize_t ga_pipe_read_str(int fd[2], char **str)
{
ssize_t n, len = 0;
char buf[1024];
close(fd[1]);
fd[1] = -1;
while ((n = read(fd[0], buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) {
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR) {
continue;
} else {
len = -errno;
break;
}
}
*str = g_realloc(*str, len + n + 1);
memcpy(*str + len, buf, n);
len += n;
*str[len] = '\0';
}
close(fd[0]);
fd[0] = -1;
return len;
}
/*
* Helper to run command with input/output redirection,
* sending string to stdin and taking error message from
* stdout/err.
*/
static int ga_run_command(const char *argv[], const char *in_str,
const char *action, Error **errp)
{
pid_t pid;
int status;
int retcode = -1;
int infd[2] = { -1, -1 };
int outfd[2] = { -1, -1 };
char *str = NULL;
ssize_t len = 0;
if ((in_str && !g_unix_open_pipe(infd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) ||
!g_unix_open_pipe(outfd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) {
error_setg(errp, "cannot create pipe FDs");
goto out;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
char *cherr = NULL;
setsid();
if (in_str) {
/* Redirect stdin to infd. */
close(infd[1]);
dup2(infd[0], 0);
close(infd[0]);
} else {
reopen_fd_to_null(0);
}
/* Redirect stdout/stderr to outfd. */
close(outfd[0]);
dup2(outfd[1], 1);
dup2(outfd[1], 2);
close(outfd[1]);
execvp(argv[0], (char *const *)argv);
/* Write the cause of failed exec to pipe for the parent to read it. */
cherr = g_strdup_printf("failed to exec '%s'", argv[0]);
perror(cherr);
g_free(cherr);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pid < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
goto out;
}
if (in_str) {
close(infd[0]);
infd[0] = -1;
if (qemu_write_full(infd[1], in_str, strlen(in_str)) !=
strlen(in_str)) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "%s: cannot write to stdin pipe",
action);
goto out;
}
close(infd[1]);
infd[1] = -1;
}
len = ga_pipe_read_str(outfd, &str);
if (len < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -len, "%s: cannot read from stdout/stderr pipe",
action);
goto out;
}
ga_wait_child(pid, &status, errp);
if (*errp) {
goto out;
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
if (len) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally: %s",
str);
} else {
error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
}
goto out;
}
retcode = WEXITSTATUS(status);
if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
if (len) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to %s: %s",
action, str);
} else {
error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to %s: exit status %d",
action, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
goto out;
}
out:
g_free(str);
if (infd[0] != -1) {
close(infd[0]);
}
if (infd[1] != -1) {
close(infd[1]);
}
if (outfd[0] != -1) {
close(outfd[0]);
}
if (outfd[1] != -1) {
close(outfd[1]);
}
return retcode;
}
void qmp_guest_shutdown(const char *mode, Error **errp)
{
const char *shutdown_flag;
Error *local_err = NULL;
pid_t pid;
int status;
#ifdef CONFIG_SOLARIS
const char *powerdown_flag = "-i5";
@ -110,67 +257,31 @@ void qmp_guest_shutdown(const char *mode, Error **errp)
return;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
/* child, start the shutdown */
setsid();
reopen_fd_to_null(0);
reopen_fd_to_null(1);
reopen_fd_to_null(2);
const char *argv[] = {"/sbin/shutdown",
#ifdef CONFIG_SOLARIS
execl("/sbin/shutdown", "shutdown", shutdown_flag, "-g0", "-y",
"hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *)NULL);
shutdown_flag, "-g0", "-y",
#elif defined(CONFIG_BSD)
execl("/sbin/shutdown", "shutdown", shutdown_flag, "+0",
"hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *)NULL);
shutdown_flag, "+0",
#else
execl("/sbin/shutdown", "shutdown", "-h", shutdown_flag, "+0",
"hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *)NULL);
"-h", shutdown_flag, "+0",
#endif
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pid < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
return;
}
"hypervisor initiated shutdown", (char *) NULL};
ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
ga_run_command(argv, NULL, "shutdown", &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
return;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to shutdown");
return;
}
/* succeeded */
}
void qmp_guest_set_time(bool has_time, int64_t time_ns, Error **errp)
{
int ret;
int status;
pid_t pid;
Error *local_err = NULL;
struct timeval tv;
static const char hwclock_path[] = "/sbin/hwclock";
static int hwclock_available = -1;
if (hwclock_available < 0) {
hwclock_available = (access(hwclock_path, X_OK) == 0);
}
if (!hwclock_available) {
error_setg(errp, QERR_UNSUPPORTED);
return;
}
const char *argv[] = {"/sbin/hwclock", has_time ? "-w" : "-s", NULL};
/* If user has passed a time, validate and set it. */
if (has_time) {
@ -201,37 +312,12 @@ void qmp_guest_set_time(bool has_time, int64_t time_ns, Error **errp)
* just need to synchronize the hardware clock. However, if no time was
* passed, user is requesting the opposite: set the system time from the
* hardware clock (RTC). */
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
setsid();
reopen_fd_to_null(0);
reopen_fd_to_null(1);
reopen_fd_to_null(2);
/* Use '/sbin/hwclock -w' to set RTC from the system time,
* or '/sbin/hwclock -s' to set the system time from RTC. */
execl(hwclock_path, "hwclock", has_time ? "-w" : "-s", NULL);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pid < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
return;
}
ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
ga_run_command(argv, NULL, "set hardware clock to system time",
&local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
return;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "hwclock failed to set hardware clock to system time");
return;
}
}
typedef enum {
@ -650,8 +736,6 @@ static const char *fsfreeze_hook_arg_string[] = {
static void execute_fsfreeze_hook(FsfreezeHookArg arg, Error **errp)
{
int status;
pid_t pid;
const char *hook;
const char *arg_str = fsfreeze_hook_arg_string[arg];
Error *local_err = NULL;
@ -660,42 +744,15 @@ static void execute_fsfreeze_hook(FsfreezeHookArg arg, Error **errp)
if (!hook) {
return;
}
if (access(hook, X_OK) != 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "can't access fsfreeze hook '%s'", hook);
return;
}
const char *argv[] = {hook, arg_str, NULL};
slog("executing fsfreeze hook with arg '%s'", arg_str);
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
setsid();
reopen_fd_to_null(0);
reopen_fd_to_null(1);
reopen_fd_to_null(2);
execl(hook, hook, arg_str, NULL);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pid < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
return;
}
ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
ga_run_command(argv, NULL, "execute fsfreeze hook", &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "fsfreeze hook has terminated abnormally");
return;
}
status = WEXITSTATUS(status);
if (status) {
error_setg(errp, "fsfreeze hook has failed with status %d", status);
return;
}
}
/*
@ -1569,8 +1626,10 @@ static GuestFilesystemInfo *build_guest_fsinfo(struct FsMount *mount,
nonroot_total = used + buf.f_bavail;
fs->used_bytes = used * fr_size;
fs->total_bytes = nonroot_total * fr_size;
fs->total_bytes_privileged = buf.f_blocks * fr_size;
fs->has_total_bytes = true;
fs->has_total_bytes_privileged = true;
fs->has_used_bytes = true;
}
@ -1869,52 +1928,21 @@ static bool linux_sys_state_supports_mode(SuspendMode mode, Error **errp)
static void linux_sys_state_suspend(SuspendMode mode, Error **errp)
{
Error *local_err = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) local_gerr = NULL;
const char *sysfile_strs[3] = {"disk", "mem", NULL};
const char *sysfile_str = sysfile_strs[mode];
pid_t pid;
int status;
if (!sysfile_str) {
error_setg(errp, "unknown guest suspend mode");
return;
}
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
/* child */
int fd;
setsid();
reopen_fd_to_null(0);
reopen_fd_to_null(1);
reopen_fd_to_null(2);
fd = open(LINUX_SYS_STATE_FILE, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (write(fd, sysfile_str, strlen(sysfile_str)) < 0) {
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} else if (pid < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
if (!g_file_set_contents(LINUX_SYS_STATE_FILE, sysfile_str,
-1, &local_gerr)) {
error_setg(errp, "suspend: cannot write to '%s': %s",
LINUX_SYS_STATE_FILE, local_gerr->message);
return;
}
ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to suspend");
}
}
static void guest_suspend(SuspendMode mode, Error **errp)
@ -2123,14 +2151,8 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username,
Error **errp)
{
Error *local_err = NULL;
char *passwd_path = NULL;
pid_t pid;
int status;
int datafd[2] = { -1, -1 };
char *rawpasswddata = NULL;
g_autofree char *rawpasswddata = NULL;
size_t rawpasswdlen;
char *chpasswddata = NULL;
size_t chpasswdlen;
rawpasswddata = (char *)qbase64_decode(password, -1, &rawpasswdlen, errp);
if (!rawpasswddata) {
@ -2141,95 +2163,31 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username,
if (strchr(rawpasswddata, '\n')) {
error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in raw password");
goto out;
return;
}
if (strchr(username, '\n') ||
strchr(username, ':')) {
error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in username");
goto out;
return;
}
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
chpasswddata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata);
passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("pw");
g_autofree char *chpasswdata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata);
const char *crypt_flag = crypted ? "-H" : "-h";
const char *argv[] = {"pw", "usermod", "-n", username,
crypt_flag, "0", NULL};
#else
chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, rawpasswddata);
passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("chpasswd");
g_autofree char *chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username,
rawpasswddata);
const char *crypt_flag = crypted ? "-e" : NULL;
const char *argv[] = {"chpasswd", crypt_flag, NULL};
#endif
chpasswdlen = strlen(chpasswddata);
if (!passwd_path) {
error_setg(errp, "cannot find 'passwd' program in PATH");
goto out;
}
if (!g_unix_open_pipe(datafd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) {
error_setg(errp, "cannot create pipe FDs");
goto out;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(datafd[1]);
/* child */
setsid();
dup2(datafd[0], 0);
reopen_fd_to_null(1);
reopen_fd_to_null(2);
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
const char *h_arg;
h_arg = (crypted) ? "-H" : "-h";
execl(passwd_path, "pw", "usermod", "-n", username, h_arg, "0", NULL);
#else
if (crypted) {
execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", "-e", NULL);
} else {
execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", NULL);
}
#endif
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pid < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
goto out;
}
close(datafd[0]);
datafd[0] = -1;
if (qemu_write_full(datafd[1], chpasswddata, chpasswdlen) != chpasswdlen) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "cannot write new account password");
goto out;
}
close(datafd[1]);
datafd[1] = -1;
ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
ga_run_command(argv, chpasswddata, "set user password", &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
goto out;
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
goto out;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to set user password");
goto out;
}
out:
g_free(chpasswddata);
g_free(rawpasswddata);
g_free(passwd_path);
if (datafd[0] != -1) {
close(datafd[0]);
}
if (datafd[1] != -1) {
close(datafd[1]);
return;
}
}
#else /* __linux__ || __FreeBSD__ */

View File

@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ static GuestFilesystemInfo *build_guest_fsinfo(char *guid, Error **errp)
fs = g_malloc(sizeof(*fs));
fs->name = g_strdup(guid);
fs->has_total_bytes = false;
fs->has_total_bytes_privileged = false;
fs->has_used_bytes = false;
if (len == 0) {
fs->mountpoint = g_strdup("System Reserved");

712
qga/commands-windows-ssh.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,712 @@
/*
* QEMU Guest Agent win32-specific command implementations for SSH keys.
* The implementation is opinionated and expects the SSH implementation to
* be OpenSSH.
*
* Copyright Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. 2024
*
* Authors:
* Aidan Leuck <aidan_leuck@selinc.com>
*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
* See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*/
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include <aclapi.h>
#include <qga-qapi-types.h>
#include "commands-common-ssh.h"
#include "commands-windows-ssh.h"
#include "guest-agent-core.h"
#include "limits.h"
#include "lmaccess.h"
#include "lmapibuf.h"
#include "lmerr.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "qga-qapi-commands.h"
#include "sddl.h"
#include "shlobj.h"
#include "userenv.h"
#define AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE "authorized_keys"
#define AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE_ADMIN "administrators_authorized_keys"
#define LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID "S-1-5-18"
#define ADMIN_SID "S-1-5-32-544"
/*
* Frees userInfo structure. This implements the g_auto cleanup
* for the structure.
*/
void free_userInfo(PWindowsUserInfo info)
{
g_free(info->sshDirectory);
g_free(info->authorizedKeyFile);
LocalFree(info->SSID);
g_free(info->username);
g_free(info);
}
/*
* Gets the admin SSH folder for OpenSSH. OpenSSH does not store
* the authorized_key file in the users home directory for security reasons and
* instead stores it at %PROGRAMDATA%/ssh. This function returns the path to
* that directory on the users machine
*
* parameters:
* errp -> error structure to set when an error occurs
* returns: The path to the ssh folder in %PROGRAMDATA% or NULL if an error
* occurred.
*/
static char *get_admin_ssh_folder(Error **errp)
{
/* Allocate memory for the program data path */
g_autofree char *programDataPath = NULL;
char *authkeys_path = NULL;
PWSTR pgDataW = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) gerr = NULL;
/* Get the KnownFolderPath on the machine. */
HRESULT folderResult =
SHGetKnownFolderPath(&FOLDERID_ProgramData, 0, NULL, &pgDataW);
if (folderResult != S_OK) {
error_setg(errp, "Failed to retrieve ProgramData folder");
return NULL;
}
/* Convert from a wide string back to a standard character string. */
programDataPath = g_utf16_to_utf8(pgDataW, -1, NULL, NULL, &gerr);
CoTaskMemFree(pgDataW);
if (!programDataPath) {
error_setg(errp,
"Failed converting ProgramData folder path to UTF-16 %s",
gerr->message);
return NULL;
}
/* Build the path to the file. */
authkeys_path = g_build_filename(programDataPath, "ssh", NULL);
return authkeys_path;
}
/*
* Gets the path to the SSH folder for the specified user. If the user is an
* admin it returns the ssh folder located at %PROGRAMDATA%/ssh. If the user is
* not an admin it returns %USERPROFILE%/.ssh
*
* parameters:
* username -> Username to get the SSH folder for
* isAdmin -> Whether the user is an admin or not
* errp -> Error structure to set any errors that occur.
* returns: path to the ssh folder as a string.
*/
static char *get_ssh_folder(const char *username, const bool isAdmin,
Error **errp)
{
DWORD maxSize = MAX_PATH;
g_autofree char *profilesDir = g_new0(char, maxSize);
if (isAdmin) {
return get_admin_ssh_folder(errp);
}
/* If not an Admin the SSH key is in the user directory. */
/* Get the user profile directory on the machine. */
BOOL ret = GetProfilesDirectory(profilesDir, &maxSize);
if (!ret) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
"failed to retrieve profiles directory");
return NULL;
}
/* Builds the filename */
return g_build_filename(profilesDir, username, ".ssh", NULL);
}
/*
* Creates an entry for the user so they can access the ssh folder in their
* userprofile.
*
* parameters:
* userInfo -> Information about the current user
* pACL -> Pointer to an ACL structure
* errp -> Error structure to set any errors that occur
* returns -> 1 on success, 0 otherwise
*/
static bool create_acl_user(PWindowsUserInfo userInfo, PACL *pACL, Error **errp)
{
const int aclSize = 1;
PACL newACL = NULL;
EXPLICIT_ACCESS eAccess[1];
PSID userPSID = NULL;
/* Get a pointer to the internal SID object in Windows */
bool converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(userInfo->SSID, &userPSID);
if (!converted) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve user %s SID",
userInfo->username);
goto error;
}
/* Set the permissions for the user. */
eAccess[0].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL;
eAccess[0].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
eAccess[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_USER;
eAccess[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)userPSID;
/* Set the ACL entries */
DWORD setResult;
/*
* If we are given a pointer that is already initialized, then we can merge
* the existing entries instead of overwriting them.
*/
if (*pACL) {
setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, *pACL, &newACL);
} else {
setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, NULL, &newACL);
}
if (setResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
"failed to set ACL entries for user %s %lu",
userInfo->username, setResult);
goto error;
}
/* Free any old memory since we are going to overwrite the users pointer. */
LocalFree(*pACL);
*pACL = newACL;
LocalFree(userPSID);
return true;
error:
LocalFree(userPSID);
return false;
}
/*
* Creates a base ACL for both normal users and admins to share
* pACL -> Pointer to an ACL structure
* errp -> Error structure to set any errors that occur
* returns: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
*/
static bool create_acl_base(PACL *pACL, Error **errp)
{
PSID adminGroupPSID = NULL;
PSID systemPSID = NULL;
const int aclSize = 2;
EXPLICIT_ACCESS eAccess[2];
/* Create an entry for the system user. */
const char *systemSID = LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID;
bool converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(systemSID, &systemPSID);
if (!converted) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve system SID");
goto error;
}
/* set permissions for system user */
eAccess[0].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL;
eAccess[0].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
eAccess[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
eAccess[0].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_USER;
eAccess[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)systemPSID;
/* Create an entry for the admin user. */
const char *adminSID = ADMIN_SID;
converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(adminSID, &adminGroupPSID);
if (!converted) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve Admin SID");
goto error;
}
/* Set permissions for admin group. */
eAccess[1].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL;
eAccess[1].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
eAccess[1].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
eAccess[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
eAccess[1].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP;
eAccess[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)adminGroupPSID;
/* Put the entries in an ACL object. */
PACL pNewACL = NULL;
DWORD setResult;
/*
*If we are given a pointer that is already initialized, then we can merge
*the existing entries instead of overwriting them.
*/
if (*pACL) {
setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, *pACL, &pNewACL);
} else {
setResult = SetEntriesInAcl(aclSize, eAccess, NULL, &pNewACL);
}
if (setResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
"failed to set base ACL entries for system user and "
"admin group %lu",
setResult);
goto error;
}
LocalFree(adminGroupPSID);
LocalFree(systemPSID);
/* Free any old memory since we are going to overwrite the users pointer. */
LocalFree(*pACL);
*pACL = pNewACL;
return true;
error:
LocalFree(adminGroupPSID);
LocalFree(systemPSID);
return false;
}
/*
* Sets the access control on the authorized_keys file and any ssh folders that
* need to be created. For administrators the required permissions on the
* file/folders are that only administrators and the LocalSystem account can
* access the folders. For normal user accounts only the specified user,
* LocalSystem and Administrators can have access to the key.
*
* parameters:
* userInfo -> pointer to structure that contains information about the user
* PACL -> pointer to an access control structure that will be set upon
* successful completion of the function.
* errp -> error structure that will be set upon error.
* returns: 1 upon success 0 upon failure.
*/
static bool create_acl(PWindowsUserInfo userInfo, PACL *pACL, Error **errp)
{
/*
* Creates a base ACL that both admins and users will share
* This adds the Administrators group and the SYSTEM group
*/
if (!create_acl_base(pACL, errp)) {
return false;
}
/*
* If the user is not an admin give the user creating the key permission to
* access the file.
*/
if (!userInfo->isAdmin) {
if (!create_acl_user(userInfo, pACL, errp)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Create the SSH directory for the user and d sets appropriate permissions.
* In general the directory will be %PROGRAMDATA%/ssh if the user is an admin.
* %USERPOFILE%/.ssh if not an admin
*
* parameters:
* userInfo -> Contains information about the user
* errp -> Structure that will contain errors if the function fails.
* returns: zero upon failure, 1 upon success
*/
static bool create_ssh_directory(WindowsUserInfo *userInfo, Error **errp)
{
PACL pNewACL = NULL;
g_autofree PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSD = NULL;
/* Gets the appropriate ACL for the user */
if (!create_acl(userInfo, &pNewACL, errp)) {
goto error;
}
/* Allocate memory for a security descriptor */
pSD = g_malloc(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(pSD, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
"Failed to initialize security descriptor");
goto error;
}
/* Associate the security descriptor with the ACL permissions. */
if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(pSD, TRUE, pNewACL, FALSE)) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
"Failed to set security descriptor ACL");
goto error;
}
/* Set the security attributes on the folder */
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sAttr;
sAttr.bInheritHandle = FALSE;
sAttr.nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES);
sAttr.lpSecurityDescriptor = pSD;
/* Create the directory with the created permissions */
BOOL created = CreateDirectory(userInfo->sshDirectory, &sAttr);
if (!created) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to create directory %s",
userInfo->sshDirectory);
goto error;
}
/* Free memory */
LocalFree(pNewACL);
return true;
error:
LocalFree(pNewACL);
return false;
}
/*
* Sets permissions on the authorized_key_file that is created.
*
* parameters: userInfo -> Information about the user
* errp -> error structure that will contain errors upon failure
* returns: 1 upon success, zero upon failure.
*/
static bool set_file_permissions(PWindowsUserInfo userInfo, Error **errp)
{
PACL pACL = NULL;
PSID userPSID;
/* Creates the access control structure */
if (!create_acl(userInfo, &pACL, errp)) {
goto error;
}
/* Get the PSID structure for the user based off the string SID. */
bool converted = ConvertStringSidToSid(userInfo->SSID, &userPSID);
if (!converted) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(), "failed to retrieve user %s SID",
userInfo->username);
goto error;
}
/* Prevents permissions from being inherited and use the DACL provided. */
const SE_OBJECT_TYPE securityBitFlags =
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION;
/* Set the ACL on the file. */
if (SetNamedSecurityInfo(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, SE_FILE_OBJECT,
securityBitFlags, userPSID, NULL, pACL,
NULL) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
"failed to set file security for file %s",
userInfo->authorizedKeyFile);
goto error;
}
LocalFree(pACL);
LocalFree(userPSID);
return true;
error:
LocalFree(pACL);
LocalFree(userPSID);
return false;
}
/*
* Writes the specified keys to the authenticated keys file.
* parameters:
* userInfo: Information about the user we are writing the authkeys file to.
* authkeys: Array of keys to write to disk
* errp: Error structure that will contain any errors if they occur.
* returns: 1 if successful, 0 otherwise.
*/
static bool write_authkeys(WindowsUserInfo *userInfo, GStrv authkeys,
Error **errp)
{
g_autofree char *contents = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) err = NULL;
contents = g_strjoinv("\n", authkeys);
if (!g_file_set_contents(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, contents, -1, &err)) {
error_setg(errp, "failed to write to '%s': %s",
userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, err->message);
return false;
}
if (!set_file_permissions(userInfo, errp)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Retrieves information about a Windows user by their username
*
* parameters:
* userInfo -> Double pointer to a WindowsUserInfo structure. Upon success, it
* will be allocated with information about the user and need to be freed.
* username -> Name of the user to lookup.
* errp -> Contains any errors that occur.
* returns: 1 upon success, 0 upon failure.
*/
static bool get_user_info(PWindowsUserInfo *userInfo, const char *username,
Error **errp)
{
DWORD infoLevel = 4;
LPUSER_INFO_4 uBuf = NULL;
g_autofree wchar_t *wideUserName = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) gerr = NULL;
PSID psid = NULL;
/*
* Converts a string to a Windows wide string since the GetNetUserInfo
* function requires it.
*/
wideUserName = g_utf8_to_utf16(username, -1, NULL, NULL, &gerr);
if (!wideUserName) {
goto error;
}
/* allocate data */
PWindowsUserInfo uData = g_new0(WindowsUserInfo, 1);
/* Set pointer so it can be cleaned up by the callee, even upon error. */
*userInfo = uData;
/* Find the information */
NET_API_STATUS result =
NetUserGetInfo(NULL, wideUserName, infoLevel, (LPBYTE *)&uBuf);
if (result != NERR_Success) {
/* Give a friendlier error message if the user was not found. */
if (result == NERR_UserNotFound) {
error_setg(errp, "User %s was not found", username);
goto error;
}
error_setg(errp,
"Received unexpected error when asking for user info: Error "
"Code %lu",
result);
goto error;
}
/* Get information from the buffer returned by NetUserGetInfo. */
uData->username = g_strdup(username);
uData->isAdmin = uBuf->usri4_priv == USER_PRIV_ADMIN;
psid = uBuf->usri4_user_sid;
char *sidStr = NULL;
/*
* We store the string representation of the SID not SID structure in
* memory. Callees wanting to use the SID structure should call
* ConvertStringSidToSID.
*/
if (!ConvertSidToStringSid(psid, &sidStr)) {
error_setg_win32(errp, GetLastError(),
"failed to get SID string for user %s", username);
goto error;
}
/* Store the SSID */
uData->SSID = sidStr;
/* Get the SSH folder for the user. */
char *sshFolder = get_ssh_folder(username, uData->isAdmin, errp);
if (sshFolder == NULL) {
goto error;
}
/* Get the authorized key file path */
const char *authorizedKeyFile =
uData->isAdmin ? AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE_ADMIN : AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILE;
char *authorizedKeyPath =
g_build_filename(sshFolder, authorizedKeyFile, NULL);
uData->sshDirectory = sshFolder;
uData->authorizedKeyFile = authorizedKeyPath;
/* Free */
NetApiBufferFree(uBuf);
return true;
error:
if (uBuf) {
NetApiBufferFree(uBuf);
}
return false;
}
/*
* Gets the list of authorized keys for a user.
*
* parameters:
* username -> Username to retrieve the keys for.
* errp -> Error structure that will display any errors through QMP.
* returns: List of keys associated with the user.
*/
GuestAuthorizedKeys *qmp_guest_ssh_get_authorized_keys(const char *username,
Error **errp)
{
GuestAuthorizedKeys *keys = NULL;
g_auto(GStrv) authKeys = NULL;
g_autoptr(GuestAuthorizedKeys) ret = NULL;
g_auto(PWindowsUserInfo) userInfo = NULL;
/* Gets user information */
if (!get_user_info(&userInfo, username, errp)) {
return NULL;
}
/* Reads authkeys for the user */
authKeys = read_authkeys(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, errp);
if (authKeys == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* Set the GuestAuthorizedKey struct with keys from the file */
ret = g_new0(GuestAuthorizedKeys, 1);
for (int i = 0; authKeys[i] != NULL; i++) {
g_strstrip(authKeys[i]);
if (!authKeys[i][0] || authKeys[i][0] == '#') {
continue;
}
QAPI_LIST_PREPEND(ret->keys, g_strdup(authKeys[i]));
}
/*
* Steal the pointer because it is up for the callee to deallocate the
* memory.
*/
keys = g_steal_pointer(&ret);
return keys;
}
/*
* Adds an ssh key for a user.
*
* parameters:
* username -> User to add the SSH key to
* strList -> Array of keys to add to the list
* has_reset -> Whether the keys have been reset
* reset -> Boolean to reset the keys (If this is set the existing list will be
* cleared) and the other key reset. errp -> Pointer to an error structure that
* will get returned over QMP if anything goes wrong.
*/
void qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
bool has_reset, bool reset, Error **errp)
{
g_auto(PWindowsUserInfo) userInfo = NULL;
g_auto(GStrv) authkeys = NULL;
strList *k;
size_t nkeys, nauthkeys;
/* Make sure the keys given are valid */
if (!check_openssh_pub_keys(keys, &nkeys, errp)) {
return;
}
/* Gets user information */
if (!get_user_info(&userInfo, username, errp)) {
return;
}
/* Determine whether we should reset the keys */
reset = has_reset && reset;
if (!reset) {
/* Read existing keys into memory */
authkeys = read_authkeys(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, NULL);
}
/* Check that the SSH key directory exists for the user. */
if (!g_file_test(userInfo->sshDirectory, G_FILE_TEST_IS_DIR)) {
BOOL success = create_ssh_directory(userInfo, errp);
if (!success) {
return;
}
}
/* Reallocates the buffer to fit the new keys. */
nauthkeys = authkeys ? g_strv_length(authkeys) : 0;
authkeys = g_realloc_n(authkeys, nauthkeys + nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
/* zero out the memory for the reallocated buffer */
memset(authkeys + nauthkeys, 0, (nkeys + 1) * sizeof(char *));
/* Adds the keys */
for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
/* Check that the key doesn't already exist */
if (g_strv_contains((const gchar *const *)authkeys, k->value)) {
continue;
}
authkeys[nauthkeys++] = g_strdup(k->value);
}
/* Write the authkeys to the file. */
write_authkeys(userInfo, authkeys, errp);
}
/*
* Removes an SSH key for a user
*
* parameters:
* username -> Username to remove the key from
* strList -> List of strings to remove
* errp -> Contains any errors that occur.
*/
void qmp_guest_ssh_remove_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
Error **errp)
{
g_auto(PWindowsUserInfo) userInfo = NULL;
g_autofree struct passwd *p = NULL;
g_autofree GStrv new_keys = NULL; /* do not own the strings */
g_auto(GStrv) authkeys = NULL;
GStrv a;
size_t nkeys = 0;
/* Validates the keys passed in by the user */
if (!check_openssh_pub_keys(keys, NULL, errp)) {
return;
}
/* Gets user information */
if (!get_user_info(&userInfo, username, errp)) {
return;
}
/* Reads the authkeys for the user */
authkeys = read_authkeys(userInfo->authorizedKeyFile, errp);
if (authkeys == NULL) {
return;
}
/* Create a new buffer to hold the keys */
new_keys = g_new0(char *, g_strv_length(authkeys) + 1);
for (a = authkeys; *a != NULL; a++) {
strList *k;
/* Filters out keys that are equal to ones the user specified. */
for (k = keys; k != NULL; k = k->next) {
if (g_str_equal(k->value, *a)) {
break;
}
}
if (k != NULL) {
continue;
}
new_keys[nkeys++] = *a;
}
/* Write the new authkeys to the file. */
write_authkeys(userInfo, new_keys, errp);
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
/*
* Header file for commands-windows-ssh.c
*
* Copyright Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. 2024
*
* Authors:
* Aidan Leuck <aidan_leuck@selinc.com>
*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
* See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*/
#include <glib/gstrfuncs.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
typedef struct WindowsUserInfo {
char *sshDirectory;
char *authorizedKeyFile;
char *username;
char *SSID;
bool isAdmin;
} WindowsUserInfo;
typedef WindowsUserInfo *PWindowsUserInfo;
void free_userInfo(PWindowsUserInfo info);
G_DEFINE_AUTO_CLEANUP_FREE_FUNC(PWindowsUserInfo, free_userInfo, NULL);

View File

@ -66,13 +66,15 @@ qga_ss.add(files(
'guest-agent-command-state.c',
'main.c',
'cutils.c',
'commands-common-ssh.c'
))
if host_os == 'windows'
qga_ss.add(files(
'channel-win32.c',
'commands-win32.c',
'service-win32.c',
'vss-win32.c'
'vss-win32.c',
'commands-windows-ssh.c'
))
else
qga_ss.add(files(
@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ gen_tlb = []
qga_libs = []
if host_os == 'windows'
qga_libs += ['-lws2_32', '-lwinmm', '-lpowrprof', '-lwtsapi32', '-lwininet', '-liphlpapi', '-lnetapi32',
'-lsetupapi', '-lcfgmgr32']
'-lsetupapi', '-lcfgmgr32', '-luserenv']
if have_qga_vss
qga_libs += ['-lole32', '-loleaut32', '-lshlwapi', '-lstdc++', '-Wl,--enable-stdcall-fixup']
subdir('vss-win32')
@ -186,7 +188,7 @@ test_env.set('G_TEST_BUILDDIR', meson.current_build_dir())
# this when an alternative is implemented or when the underlying glib
# issue is identified/fix
if host_os != 'windows' and not get_option('fuzzing')
srcs = [files('commands-posix-ssh.c')]
srcs = [files('commands-common-ssh.c', 'commands-posix-ssh.c')]
i = 0
foreach output: qga_qapi_outputs
if output.startswith('qga-qapi-types') or output.startswith('qga-qapi-visit')

View File

@ -1026,7 +1026,10 @@
#
# @used-bytes: file system used bytes (since 3.0)
#
# @total-bytes: non-root file system total bytes (since 3.0)
# @total-bytes: filesystem capacity in bytes for unprivileged users (since 3.0)
#
# @total-bytes-privileged: filesystem capacity in bytes for privileged users
# (since 9.1)
#
# @disk: an array of disk hardware information that the volume lies
# on, which may be empty if the disk type is not supported
@ -1036,7 +1039,7 @@
{ 'struct': 'GuestFilesystemInfo',
'data': {'name': 'str', 'mountpoint': 'str', 'type': 'str',
'*used-bytes': 'uint64', '*total-bytes': 'uint64',
'disk': ['GuestDiskAddress']} }
'*total-bytes-privileged': 'uint64', 'disk': ['GuestDiskAddress']} }
##
# @guest-get-fsinfo:
@ -1567,9 +1570,8 @@
{ 'struct': 'GuestAuthorizedKeys',
'data': {
'keys': ['str']
},
'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
}
}
##
# @guest-ssh-get-authorized-keys:
@ -1585,8 +1587,8 @@
##
{ 'command': 'guest-ssh-get-authorized-keys',
'data': { 'username': 'str' },
'returns': 'GuestAuthorizedKeys',
'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
'returns': 'GuestAuthorizedKeys'
}
##
# @guest-ssh-add-authorized-keys:
@ -1604,8 +1606,8 @@
# Since: 5.2
##
{ 'command': 'guest-ssh-add-authorized-keys',
'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'], '*reset': 'bool' },
'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'], '*reset': 'bool' }
}
##
# @guest-ssh-remove-authorized-keys:
@ -1622,8 +1624,8 @@
# Since: 5.2
##
{ 'command': 'guest-ssh-remove-authorized-keys',
'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'] },
'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
'data': { 'username': 'str', 'keys': ['str'] }
}
##
# @GuestDiskStats: