From bbde13cd14ad4eec18529ce0bf5876058464e124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Maydell Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 12:38:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 01/28] target/arm/kvm: Retry KVM_CREATE_VM call if it fails EINTR Occasionally the KVM_CREATE_VM ioctl can return EINTR, even though there is no pending signal to be taken. In commit 94ccff13382055 we added a retry-on-EINTR loop to the KVM_CREATE_VM call in the generic KVM code. Adopt the same approach for the use of the ioctl in the Arm-specific KVM code (where we use it to create a scratch VM for probing for various things). For more information, see the mailing list thread: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/8735e0s1zw.wl-maz@kernel.org/ Reported-by: Vitaly Chikunov Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Eric Auger Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Message-id: 20220930113824.1933293-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org --- target/arm/kvm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/target/arm/kvm.c b/target/arm/kvm.c index e5c1bd50d2..1e4de9b42e 100644 --- a/target/arm/kvm.c +++ b/target/arm/kvm.c @@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ bool kvm_arm_create_scratch_host_vcpu(const uint32_t *cpus_to_try, if (max_vm_pa_size < 0) { max_vm_pa_size = 0; } - vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, max_vm_pa_size); + do { + vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, max_vm_pa_size); + } while (vmfd == -1 && errno == EINTR); if (vmfd < 0) { goto err; } From 06f2adccfa26be55237ac966c376a42c52efb299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerome Forissier Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 09:23:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/28] target/arm: allow setting SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when FEAT_SME is implemented Updates write_scr() to allow setting SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when FEAT_SME is implemented. SCR_EL3 being a 64-bit register, valid_mask is changed to uint64_t and the SCR_* constants in target/arm/cpu.h are extended to 64-bit so that masking and bitwise not (~) behave as expected. This enables booting Linux with Trusted Firmware-A at EL3 with "-M virt,secure=on -cpu max". Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Fixes: 78cb9776662a ("target/arm: Enable SME for -cpu max") Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221004072354.27037-1-jerome.forissier@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/cpu.h | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- target/arm/helper.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h index 429ed42eec..68d99565ac 100644 --- a/target/arm/cpu.h +++ b/target/arm/cpu.h @@ -1664,33 +1664,33 @@ static inline void xpsr_write(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t val, uint32_t mask) #define HPFAR_NS (1ULL << 63) -#define SCR_NS (1U << 0) -#define SCR_IRQ (1U << 1) -#define SCR_FIQ (1U << 2) -#define SCR_EA (1U << 3) -#define SCR_FW (1U << 4) -#define SCR_AW (1U << 5) -#define SCR_NET (1U << 6) -#define SCR_SMD (1U << 7) -#define SCR_HCE (1U << 8) -#define SCR_SIF (1U << 9) -#define SCR_RW (1U << 10) -#define SCR_ST (1U << 11) -#define SCR_TWI (1U << 12) -#define SCR_TWE (1U << 13) -#define SCR_TLOR (1U << 14) -#define SCR_TERR (1U << 15) -#define SCR_APK (1U << 16) -#define SCR_API (1U << 17) -#define SCR_EEL2 (1U << 18) -#define SCR_EASE (1U << 19) -#define SCR_NMEA (1U << 20) -#define SCR_FIEN (1U << 21) -#define SCR_ENSCXT (1U << 25) -#define SCR_ATA (1U << 26) -#define SCR_FGTEN (1U << 27) -#define SCR_ECVEN (1U << 28) -#define SCR_TWEDEN (1U << 29) +#define SCR_NS (1ULL << 0) +#define SCR_IRQ (1ULL << 1) +#define SCR_FIQ (1ULL << 2) +#define SCR_EA (1ULL << 3) +#define SCR_FW (1ULL << 4) +#define SCR_AW (1ULL << 5) +#define SCR_NET (1ULL << 6) +#define SCR_SMD (1ULL << 7) +#define SCR_HCE (1ULL << 8) +#define SCR_SIF (1ULL << 9) +#define SCR_RW (1ULL << 10) +#define SCR_ST (1ULL << 11) +#define SCR_TWI (1ULL << 12) +#define SCR_TWE (1ULL << 13) +#define SCR_TLOR (1ULL << 14) +#define SCR_TERR (1ULL << 15) +#define SCR_APK (1ULL << 16) +#define SCR_API (1ULL << 17) +#define SCR_EEL2 (1ULL << 18) +#define SCR_EASE (1ULL << 19) +#define SCR_NMEA (1ULL << 20) +#define SCR_FIEN (1ULL << 21) +#define SCR_ENSCXT (1ULL << 25) +#define SCR_ATA (1ULL << 26) +#define SCR_FGTEN (1ULL << 27) +#define SCR_ECVEN (1ULL << 28) +#define SCR_TWEDEN (1ULL << 29) #define SCR_TWEDEL MAKE_64BIT_MASK(30, 4) #define SCR_TME (1ULL << 34) #define SCR_AMVOFFEN (1ULL << 35) diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index db3b1ea72d..c08a7b35a0 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -1752,7 +1752,7 @@ static void vbar_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) { /* Begin with base v8.0 state. */ - uint32_t valid_mask = 0x3fff; + uint64_t valid_mask = 0x3fff; ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); /* @@ -1789,6 +1789,9 @@ static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_doublefault, cpu)) { valid_mask |= SCR_EASE | SCR_NMEA; } + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sme, cpu)) { + valid_mask |= SCR_ENTP2; + } } else { valid_mask &= ~(SCR_RW | SCR_ST); if (cpu_isar_feature(aa32_ras, cpu)) { From 86a85d73e3167c97da8f9680536af89e66943b76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joel Stanley Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 15:30:42 +1030 Subject: [PATCH 03/28] docs/nuvoton: Update URL for images MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit openpower.xyz was retired some time ago. The OpenBMC Jenkins is where images can be found these days. Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley Reviewed-by: Hao Wu Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Message-id: 20221004050042.22681-1-joel@jms.id.au Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst b/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst index ef2792076a..c38df32bde 100644 --- a/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst +++ b/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst @@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ Boot options The Nuvoton machines can boot from an OpenBMC firmware image, or directly into a kernel using the ``-kernel`` option. OpenBMC images for ``quanta-gsj`` and -possibly others can be downloaded from the OpenPOWER jenkins : +possibly others can be downloaded from the OpenBMC jenkins : - https://openpower.xyz/ + https://jenkins.openbmc.org/ The firmware image should be attached as an MTD drive. Example : From c7637be307d36ad8c51bd0e9852e09115969bc29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:37 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 04/28] target/arm: Split s2walk_secure from ipa_secure in get_phys_addr The starting security state comes with the translation regime, not the current state of arm_is_secure_below_el3(). Create a new local variable, s2walk_secure, which does not need to be written back to result->attrs.secure -- we compute that value later, after the S2 walk is complete. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-2-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 2ddfc028ab..b8c494ad9f 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -2298,7 +2298,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, hwaddr ipa; int s1_prot; int ret; - bool ipa_secure; + bool ipa_secure, s2walk_secure; ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs1; ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx; bool is_el0; @@ -2313,17 +2313,17 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, ipa = result->phys; ipa_secure = result->attrs.secure; - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - if (ipa_secure) { - result->attrs.secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW); - } else { - result->attrs.secure = !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW); - } + if (is_secure) { + /* Select TCR based on the NS bit from the S1 walk. */ + s2walk_secure = !(ipa_secure + ? env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW + : env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW); } else { assert(!ipa_secure); + s2walk_secure = false; } - s2_mmu_idx = (result->attrs.secure + s2_mmu_idx = (s2walk_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2); is_el0 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0; @@ -2366,7 +2366,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, result->cacheattrs); /* Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space. */ - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { + if (is_secure) { if (ipa_secure) { result->attrs.secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW)); From 9b5ba97ac77889b9bf7d27d40da232ee8ff40b09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2022 08:21:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 05/28] target/arm: Make the final stage1+2 write to secure be unconditional While the stage2 call to get_phys_addr_lpae should never set attrs.secure when given a non-secure input, it's just as easy to make the final update to attrs.secure be unconditional and false in the case of non-secure input. Suggested-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221007152159.1414065-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index b8c494ad9f..7d763a5847 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -2365,17 +2365,16 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, result->cacheattrs = combine_cacheattrs(env, cacheattrs1, result->cacheattrs); - /* Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space. */ - if (is_secure) { - if (ipa_secure) { - result->attrs.secure = - !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW)); - } else { - result->attrs.secure = - !((env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & (VTCR_NSA | VTCR_NSW)) - || (env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW))); - } - } + /* + * Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space. + * Note that VSTCR overrides VTCR and {N}SW overrides {N}SA. + */ + result->attrs.secure = + (is_secure + && !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW)) + && (ipa_secure + || !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & (VTCR_NSA | VTCR_NSW)))); + return 0; } else { /* From c23f08a56cf01f947e2554339b42f641d5853d32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:38 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 06/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to get_phys_addr_lpae MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Remove the use of regime_is_secure from get_phys_addr_lpae, using the new parameter instead. Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-3-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 7d763a5847..96ed8e13af 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address, MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, - bool s1_is_el0, GetPhysAddrResult *result, - ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) + bool is_secure, bool s1_is_el0, + GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) __attribute__((nonnull)); /* This mapping is common between ID_AA64MMFR0.PARANGE and TCR_ELx.{I}PS. */ @@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {}; int ret; - ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx, false, - &s2, fi); + ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx, + *is_secure, false, &s2, fi); if (ret) { assert(fi->type != ARMFault_None); fi->s2addr = addr; @@ -965,8 +965,8 @@ static bool check_s2_mmu_setup(ARMCPU *cpu, bool is_aa64, int level, */ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address, MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, - bool s1_is_el0, GetPhysAddrResult *result, - ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) + bool is_secure, bool s1_is_el0, + GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) { ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); /* Read an LPAE long-descriptor translation table. */ @@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address, * remain non-secure. We implement this by just ORing in the NSTable/NS * bits at each step. */ - tableattrs = regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx) ? 0 : (1 << 4); + tableattrs = is_secure ? 0 : (1 << 4); for (;;) { uint64_t descriptor; bool nstable; @@ -2337,7 +2337,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result)); ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, ipa, access_type, s2_mmu_idx, - is_el0, result, fi); + s2walk_secure, is_el0, result, fi); fi->s2addr = ipa; /* Combine the S1 and S2 perms. */ @@ -2504,8 +2504,8 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, } if (regime_using_lpae_format(env, mmu_idx)) { - return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, false, - result, fi); + return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, + is_secure, false, result, fi); } else if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_XP) { return get_phys_addr_v6(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, is_secure, result, fi); From bf25b7b079c523c8eeebb35c0f914dd2cf3fba24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:39 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 07/28] target/arm: Fix S2 disabled check in S1_ptw_translate Pass the correct stage2 mmu_idx to regime_translation_disabled, which we computed afterward. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-4-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 96ed8e13af..631d1e25f1 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -200,10 +200,10 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, hwaddr addr, bool *is_secure, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) { + ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2; + if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) && - !regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2)) { - ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S - : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2; + !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx)) { GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {}; int ret; From 7e80c0a4ff68da09e1de292e4660f959ffed6fcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:40 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 08/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to regime_translation_disabled MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Remove the use of regime_is_secure from regime_translation_disabled, using the new parameter instead. This fixes a bug in S1_ptw_translate and get_phys_addr where we had passed ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 and not ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S to determine if Stage2 is disabled, affecting FEAT_SEL2. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-5-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 631d1e25f1..d789807b08 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -131,12 +131,13 @@ static uint64_t regime_ttbr(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, int ttbrn) } /* Return true if the specified stage of address translation is disabled */ -static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) +static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, + bool is_secure) { uint64_t hcr_el2; if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) { - switch (env->v7m.mpu_ctrl[regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx)] & + switch (env->v7m.mpu_ctrl[is_secure] & (R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK | R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK)) { case R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK: /* Enabled, but not for HardFault and NMI */ @@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) if (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE) { /* TGE means that NS EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */ - if (!regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx) && regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) { + if (!is_secure && regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) { return true; } } @@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2; if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) && - !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx)) { + !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, *is_secure)) { GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {}; int ret; @@ -1357,7 +1358,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, uint32_t base; bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx); - if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx)) { + if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) { /* MPU disabled. */ result->phys = address; result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; @@ -1521,7 +1522,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; result->prot = 0; - if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx) || + if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure) || m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) { /* * MPU disabled or M profile PPB access: use default memory map. @@ -1733,7 +1734,7 @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, * are done in arm_v7m_load_vector(), which always does a direct * read using address_space_ldl(), rather than going via this function. */ - if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx)) { /* MPU disabled */ + if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure)) { /* MPU disabled */ hit = true; } else if (m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) { hit = true; @@ -2307,7 +2308,8 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, result, fi); /* If S1 fails or S2 is disabled, return early. */ - if (ret || regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2)) { + if (ret || regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2, + is_secure)) { return ret; } @@ -2437,7 +2439,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, /* Definitely a real MMU, not an MPU */ - if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx)) { + if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) { uint64_t hcr; uint8_t memattr; From def8aa5b80a1c12a3a758801d585c0950867ac94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 09/28] target/arm: Split out get_phys_addr_with_secure Retain the existing get_phys_addr interface using the security state derived from mmu_idx. Move the kerneldoc comments to the header file where they belong. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-6-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/internals.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/arm/ptw.c | 44 ++++++++++++++---------------------------- 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index 307a596505..3524d11dc5 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -1145,6 +1145,46 @@ typedef struct GetPhysAddrResult { ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs; } GetPhysAddrResult; +/** + * get_phys_addr_with_secure: get the physical address for a virtual address + * @env: CPUARMState + * @address: virtual address to get physical address for + * @access_type: 0 for read, 1 for write, 2 for execute + * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime + * @is_secure: security state for the access + * @result: set on translation success. + * @fi: set to fault info if the translation fails + * + * Find the physical address corresponding to the given virtual address, + * by doing a translation table walk on MMU based systems or using the + * MPU state on MPU based systems. + * + * Returns false if the translation was successful. Otherwise, phys_ptr, attrs, + * prot and page_size may not be filled in, and the populated fsr value provides + * information on why the translation aborted, in the format of a + * DFSR/IFSR fault register, with the following caveats: + * * we honour the short vs long DFSR format differences. + * * the WnR bit is never set (the caller must do this). + * * for PSMAv5 based systems we don't bother to return a full FSR format + * value. + */ +bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, + MMUAccessType access_type, + ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_secure, + GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) + __attribute__((nonnull)); + +/** + * get_phys_addr: get the physical address for a virtual address + * @env: CPUARMState + * @address: virtual address to get physical address for + * @access_type: 0 for read, 1 for write, 2 for execute + * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime + * @result: set on translation success. + * @fi: set to fault info if the translation fails + * + * Similarly, but use the security regime of @mmu_idx. + */ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index d789807b08..74dcb843fe 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -2260,35 +2260,12 @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env, return ret; } -/** - * get_phys_addr - get the physical address for this virtual address - * - * Find the physical address corresponding to the given virtual address, - * by doing a translation table walk on MMU based systems or using the - * MPU state on MPU based systems. - * - * Returns false if the translation was successful. Otherwise, phys_ptr, attrs, - * prot and page_size may not be filled in, and the populated fsr value provides - * information on why the translation aborted, in the format of a - * DFSR/IFSR fault register, with the following caveats: - * * we honour the short vs long DFSR format differences. - * * the WnR bit is never set (the caller must do this). - * * for PSMAv5 based systems we don't bother to return a full FSR format - * value. - * - * @env: CPUARMState - * @address: virtual address to get physical address for - * @access_type: 0 for read, 1 for write, 2 for execute - * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime - * @result: set on translation success. - * @fi: set to fault info if the translation fails - */ -bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, - MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, - GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) +bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, + MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, + bool is_secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result, + ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) { ARMMMUIdx s1_mmu_idx = stage_1_mmu_idx(mmu_idx); - bool is_secure = regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx); if (mmu_idx != s1_mmu_idx) { /* @@ -2304,8 +2281,8 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx; bool is_el0; - ret = get_phys_addr(env, address, access_type, s1_mmu_idx, - result, fi); + ret = get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type, + s1_mmu_idx, is_secure, result, fi); /* If S1 fails or S2 is disabled, return early. */ if (ret || regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2, @@ -2517,6 +2494,15 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, } } +bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, + MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, + GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) +{ + return get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, + regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx), + result, fi); +} + hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr, MemTxAttrs *attrs) { From 9cd5f1710e2d786042f747f128bc9e954fd7f6c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:42 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 10/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to v7m_read_half_insn MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Remove the use of regime_is_secure from v7m_read_half_insn, using the new parameter instead. As it happens, both callers pass true, propagated from the argument to arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate which created the mmu_idx argument, but that is a detail of v7m_handle_execute_nsc we need not expose to the callee. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-7-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/m_helper.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/m_helper.c b/target/arm/m_helper.c index 5ee4ee15b3..203ba411f6 100644 --- a/target/arm/m_helper.c +++ b/target/arm/m_helper.c @@ -1981,7 +1981,7 @@ static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu) return true; } -static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, +static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool secure, uint32_t addr, uint16_t *insn) { /* @@ -2003,8 +2003,7 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, ARMMMUFaultInfo fi = {}; MemTxResult txres; - v8m_security_lookup(env, addr, MMU_INST_FETCH, mmu_idx, - regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx), &sattrs); + v8m_security_lookup(env, addr, MMU_INST_FETCH, mmu_idx, secure, &sattrs); if (!sattrs.nsc || sattrs.ns) { /* * This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a @@ -2109,7 +2108,7 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu) /* We want to do the MPU lookup as secure; work out what mmu_idx that is */ mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate(env, true); - if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, env->regs[15], &insn)) { + if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, true, env->regs[15], &insn)) { return false; } @@ -2125,7 +2124,7 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu) goto gen_invep; } - if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, env->regs[15] + 2, &insn)) { + if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, true, env->regs[15] + 2, &insn)) { return false; } From a393dee0194488d3e5f5f83e4ef7ea1f3556f44f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 11/28] target/arm: Add TBFLAG_M32.SECURE Remove the use of regime_is_secure from arm_tr_init_disas_context. Instead, provide the value of v8m_secure directly from tb_flags. Rather than use regime_is_secure, use the env->v7m.secure directly, as per arm_mmu_idx_el. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-8-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/cpu.h | 2 ++ target/arm/helper.c | 4 ++++ target/arm/translate.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h index 68d99565ac..a085c17297 100644 --- a/target/arm/cpu.h +++ b/target/arm/cpu.h @@ -3203,6 +3203,8 @@ FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, NEW_FP_CTXT_NEEDED, 3, 1) /* Not cached. */ FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, FPCCR_S_WRONG, 4, 1) /* Not cached. */ /* Set if MVE insns are definitely not predicated by VPR or LTPSIZE */ FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, MVE_NO_PRED, 5, 1) /* Not cached. */ +/* Set if in secure mode */ +FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, SECURE, 6, 1) /* * Bit usage when in AArch64 state diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index c08a7b35a0..8d82c14762 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -10948,6 +10948,10 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_m32(CPUARMState *env, int fp_el, DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, STACKCHECK, 1); } + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) && env->v7m.secure) { + DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, SECURE, 1); + } + return rebuild_hflags_common_32(env, fp_el, mmu_idx, flags); } diff --git a/target/arm/translate.c b/target/arm/translate.c index 5aaccbbf71..ac647e0262 100644 --- a/target/arm/translate.c +++ b/target/arm/translate.c @@ -9351,8 +9351,7 @@ static void arm_tr_init_disas_context(DisasContextBase *dcbase, CPUState *cs) dc->vfp_enabled = 1; dc->be_data = MO_TE; dc->v7m_handler_mode = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, HANDLER); - dc->v8m_secure = arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) && - regime_is_secure(env, dc->mmu_idx); + dc->v8m_secure = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, SECURE); dc->v8m_stackcheck = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, STACKCHECK); dc->v8m_fpccr_s_wrong = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, FPCCR_S_WRONG); dc->v7m_new_fp_ctxt_needed = From 03bea66e7fa3af42976ceafb20512c59abf2e699 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 12/28] target/arm: Merge regime_is_secure into get_phys_addr This is the last use of regime_is_secure; remove it entirely before changing the layout of ARMMMUIdx. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-9-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/internals.h | 42 ---------------------------------------- target/arm/ptw.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index 3524d11dc5..14428730d4 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -670,48 +670,6 @@ static inline bool regime_has_2_ranges(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) } } -/* Return true if this address translation regime is secure */ -static inline bool regime_is_secure(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) -{ - switch (mmu_idx) { - case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_E2: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: - case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri: - case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri: - case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv: - case ARMMMUIdx_MUser: - return false; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE3: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE2: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S: - case ARMMMUIdx_MSPrivNegPri: - case ARMMMUIdx_MSUserNegPri: - case ARMMMUIdx_MSPriv: - case ARMMMUIdx_MSUser: - return true; - default: - g_assert_not_reached(); - } -} - static inline bool regime_is_pan(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) { switch (mmu_idx) { diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 74dcb843fe..55e8f33c50 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -2498,9 +2498,49 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) { + bool is_secure; + + switch (mmu_idx) { + case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: + case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: + case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: + case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: + case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_E2: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: + case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri: + case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri: + case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv: + case ARMMMUIdx_MUser: + is_secure = false; + break; + case ARMMMUIdx_SE3: + case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: + case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: + case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: + case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: + case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_SE2: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S: + case ARMMMUIdx_MSPrivNegPri: + case ARMMMUIdx_MSUserNegPri: + case ARMMMUIdx_MSPriv: + case ARMMMUIdx_MSUser: + is_secure = true; + break; + default: + g_assert_not_reached(); + } return get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, - regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx), - result, fi); + is_secure, result, fi); } hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr, From 7aee3cb9569f83353b17df05dc9d3a7f791b5fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 13/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to do_ats_write Use get_phys_addr_with_secure directly. For a-profile, this is the one place where the value of is_secure may not equal arm_is_secure(env). Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-10-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/helper.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index 8d82c14762..fd4663a946 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -3191,7 +3191,8 @@ static CPAccessResult ats_access(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value, - MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) + MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, + bool is_secure) { bool ret; uint64_t par64; @@ -3199,7 +3200,8 @@ static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value, ARMMMUFaultInfo fi = {}; GetPhysAddrResult res = {}; - ret = get_phys_addr(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx, &res, &fi); + ret = get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx, + is_secure, &res, &fi); /* * ATS operations only do S1 or S1+S2 translations, so we never @@ -3371,6 +3373,7 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) switch (el) { case 3: mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3; + secure = true; break; case 2: g_assert(!secure); /* ARMv8.4-SecEL2 is 64-bit only */ @@ -3392,6 +3395,7 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) switch (el) { case 3: mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0; + secure = true; break; case 2: g_assert(!secure); /* ARMv8.4-SecEL2 is 64-bit only */ @@ -3407,16 +3411,18 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) case 4: /* stage 1+2 NonSecure PL1: ATS12NSOPR, ATS12NSOPW */ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_1; + secure = false; break; case 6: /* stage 1+2 NonSecure PL0: ATS12NSOUR, ATS12NSOUW */ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0; + secure = false; break; default: g_assert_not_reached(); } - par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx); + par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx, secure); A32_BANKED_CURRENT_REG_SET(env, par, par64); #else @@ -3432,7 +3438,8 @@ static void ats1h_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, MMUAccessType access_type = ri->opc2 & 1 ? MMU_DATA_STORE : MMU_DATA_LOAD; uint64_t par64; - par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, ARMMMUIdx_E2); + /* There is no SecureEL2 for AArch32. */ + par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, ARMMMUIdx_E2, false); A32_BANKED_CURRENT_REG_SET(env, par, par64); #else @@ -3475,6 +3482,7 @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, break; case 6: /* AT S1E3R, AT S1E3W */ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3; + secure = true; break; default: g_assert_not_reached(); @@ -3493,7 +3501,8 @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, g_assert_not_reached(); } - env->cp15.par_el[1] = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx); + env->cp15.par_el[1] = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, + mmu_idx, secure); #else /* Handled by hardware accelerator. */ g_assert_not_reached(); From d902ae7558690a8442bf3560d5707167e485ab92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 14/28] target/arm: Fold secure and non-secure a-profile mmu indexes For a-profile aarch64, which does not bank system registers, it takes quite a lot of code to switch between security states. In the process, registers such as TCR_EL{1,2} must be swapped, which in itself requires the flushing of softmmu tlbs. Therefore it doesn't buy us anything to separate tlbs by security state. Retain the distinction between Stage2 and Stage2_S. This will be important as we implement FEAT_RME, and do not wish to add a third set of mmu indexes for Realm state. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-11-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/cpu-param.h | 2 +- target/arm/cpu.h | 72 +++++++------------ target/arm/helper.c | 144 +++++++++++++------------------------ target/arm/internals.h | 31 +------- target/arm/ptw.c | 25 ++----- target/arm/translate-a64.c | 8 --- target/arm/translate.c | 6 +- 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/cpu-param.h b/target/arm/cpu-param.h index 68ffb12427..08681828ac 100644 --- a/target/arm/cpu-param.h +++ b/target/arm/cpu-param.h @@ -32,6 +32,6 @@ # define TARGET_PAGE_BITS_MIN 10 #endif -#define NB_MMU_MODES 15 +#define NB_MMU_MODES 8 #endif diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h index a085c17297..53f4c236e1 100644 --- a/target/arm/cpu.h +++ b/target/arm/cpu.h @@ -2884,26 +2884,27 @@ bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync); * table over and over. * 6. we need separate EL1/EL2 mmu_idx for handling the Privileged Access * Never (PAN) bit within PSTATE. + * 7. we fold together the secure and non-secure regimes for A-profile, + * because there are no banked system registers for aarch64, so the + * process of switching between secure and non-secure is + * already heavyweight. * * This gives us the following list of cases: * - * NS EL0 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL0) - * NS EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL1) - * NS EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 +PAN - * NS EL0 EL2&0 - * NS EL2 EL2&0 - * NS EL2 EL2&0 +PAN - * NS EL2 (aka NS PL2) - * S EL0 EL1&0 (aka S PL0) - * S EL1 EL1&0 (not used if EL3 is 32 bit) - * S EL1 EL1&0 +PAN - * S EL3 (aka S PL1) + * EL0 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL0) + * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL1) + * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 +PAN + * EL0 EL2&0 + * EL2 EL2&0 + * EL2 EL2&0 +PAN + * EL2 (aka NS PL2) + * EL3 (aka S PL1) * - * for a total of 11 different mmu_idx. + * for a total of 8 different mmu_idx. * * R profile CPUs have an MPU, but can use the same set of MMU indexes - * as A profile. They only need to distinguish NS EL0 and NS EL1 (and - * NS EL2 if we ever model a Cortex-R52). + * as A profile. They only need to distinguish EL0 and EL1 (and + * EL2 if we ever model a Cortex-R52). * * M profile CPUs are rather different as they do not have a true MMU. * They have the following different MMU indexes: @@ -2942,9 +2943,6 @@ bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync); #define ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB 0x20 /* does not have a TLB */ #define ARM_MMU_IDX_M 0x40 /* M profile */ -/* Meanings of the bits for A profile mmu idx values */ -#define ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS 0x8 - /* Meanings of the bits for M profile mmu idx values */ #define ARM_MMU_IDX_M_PRIV 0x1 #define ARM_MMU_IDX_M_NEGPRI 0x2 @@ -2958,22 +2956,14 @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdx { /* * A-profile. */ - ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0 = 0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0 = 1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1 = 2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN = 5 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - ARMMMUIdx_SE2 = 6 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - ARMMMUIdx_SE3 = 7 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, - - ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS, - ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS, - ARMMMUIdx_E10_1 = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS, - ARMMMUIdx_E20_2 = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS, - ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS, - ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS, - ARMMMUIdx_E2 = ARMMMUIdx_SE2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS, + ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 = 0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, + ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 = 1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, + ARMMMUIdx_E10_1 = 2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, + ARMMMUIdx_E20_2 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, + ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, + ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN = 5 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, + ARMMMUIdx_E2 = 6 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, + ARMMMUIdx_E3 = 7 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A, /* * These are not allocated TLBs and are used only for AT system @@ -2982,9 +2972,6 @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdx { ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0 = 0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1 = 1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN = 2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, - ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, - ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1 = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, - ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN = 5 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, /* * Not allocated a TLB: used only for second stage of an S12 page * table walk, or for descriptor loads during first stage of an S1 @@ -2992,8 +2979,8 @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdx { * then various TLB flush insns which currently are no-ops or flush * only stage 1 MMU indexes will need to change to flush stage 2. */ - ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 = 6 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, - ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S = 7 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, + ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, + ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB, /* * M-profile. @@ -3023,14 +3010,7 @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdxBit { TO_CORE_BIT(E2), TO_CORE_BIT(E20_2), TO_CORE_BIT(E20_2_PAN), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE10_0), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE20_0), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE10_1), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE20_2), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE10_1_PAN), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE20_2_PAN), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE2), - TO_CORE_BIT(SE3), + TO_CORE_BIT(E3), TO_CORE_BIT(MUser), TO_CORE_BIT(MPriv), diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index fd4663a946..b1b8725628 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -1754,6 +1754,7 @@ static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) /* Begin with base v8.0 state. */ uint64_t valid_mask = 0x3fff; ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); + uint64_t changed; /* * Because SCR_EL3 is the "real" cpreg and SCR is the alias, reset always @@ -1816,7 +1817,22 @@ static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) /* Clear all-context RES0 bits. */ value &= valid_mask; - raw_write(env, ri, value); + changed = env->cp15.scr_el3 ^ value; + env->cp15.scr_el3 = value; + + /* + * If SCR_EL3.NS changes, i.e. arm_is_secure_below_el3, then + * we must invalidate all TLBs below EL3. + */ + if (changed & SCR_NS) { + tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(env_cpu(env), (ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0 | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0 | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E2)); + } } static void scr_reset(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri) @@ -2647,9 +2663,6 @@ static int gt_phys_redir_timeridx(CPUARMState *env) case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: return GTIMER_HYP; default: return GTIMER_PHYS; @@ -2662,9 +2675,6 @@ static int gt_virt_redir_timeridx(CPUARMState *env) case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: return GTIMER_HYPVIRT; default: return GTIMER_VIRT; @@ -3372,7 +3382,7 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) /* stage 1 current state PL1: ATS1CPR, ATS1CPW, ATS1CPRP, ATS1CPWP */ switch (el) { case 3: - mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E3; secure = true; break; case 2: @@ -3380,10 +3390,9 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) /* fall through */ case 1: if (ri->crm == 9 && (env->uncached_cpsr & CPSR_PAN)) { - mmu_idx = (secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN - : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN); + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN; } else { - mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1; } break; default: @@ -3394,7 +3403,7 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) /* stage 1 current state PL0: ATS1CUR, ATS1CUW */ switch (el) { case 3: - mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0; secure = true; break; case 2: @@ -3402,7 +3411,7 @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value) mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0; break; case 1: - mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0; break; default: g_assert_not_reached(); @@ -3471,17 +3480,16 @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, switch (ri->opc1) { case 0: /* AT S1E1R, AT S1E1W, AT S1E1RP, AT S1E1WP */ if (ri->crm == 9 && (env->pstate & PSTATE_PAN)) { - mmu_idx = (secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN - : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN); + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN; } else { - mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1; } break; case 4: /* AT S1E2R, AT S1E2W */ - mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE2 : ARMMMUIdx_E2; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E2; break; case 6: /* AT S1E3R, AT S1E3W */ - mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E3; secure = true; break; default: @@ -3489,13 +3497,13 @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, } break; case 2: /* AT S1E0R, AT S1E0W */ - mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0; break; case 4: /* AT S12E1R, AT S12E1W */ - mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1 : ARMMMUIdx_E10_1; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_1; break; case 6: /* AT S12E0R, AT S12E0W */ - mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0 : ARMMMUIdx_E10_0; + mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0; break; default: g_assert_not_reached(); @@ -3765,11 +3773,6 @@ static void vmsa_tcr_ttbr_el2_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint16_t mask = ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 | ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN | ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0; - - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - mask >>= ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS; - } - tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(env_cpu(env), mask); } raw_write(env, ri, value); @@ -3789,11 +3792,6 @@ static void vttbr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint16_t mask = ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 | ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN | ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0; - - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - mask >>= ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS; - } - tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(cs, mask); raw_write(env, ri, value); } @@ -4264,11 +4262,6 @@ static int vae1_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env) ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN | ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0; } - - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - mask >>= ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS; - } - return mask; } @@ -4295,10 +4288,6 @@ static int vae1_tlbbits(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t addr) mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0; } - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - mmu_idx &= ~ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS; - } - return tlbbits_for_regime(env, mmu_idx, addr); } @@ -4331,30 +4320,17 @@ static int alle1_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env) * stage 2 translations, whereas most other scopes only invalidate * stage 1 translations. */ - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - return ARMMMUIdxBit_SE10_1 | - ARMMMUIdxBit_SE10_1_PAN | - ARMMMUIdxBit_SE10_0; - } else { - return ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 | - ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN | - ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0; - } + return (ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0); } static int e2_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env) { - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - return ARMMMUIdxBit_SE20_0 | - ARMMMUIdxBit_SE20_2 | - ARMMMUIdxBit_SE20_2_PAN | - ARMMMUIdxBit_SE2; - } else { - return ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0 | - ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 | - ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN | - ARMMMUIdxBit_E2; - } + return (ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0 | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN | + ARMMMUIdxBit_E2); } static void tlbi_aa64_alle1_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, @@ -4381,7 +4357,7 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_alle3_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu); - tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3); + tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3); } static void tlbi_aa64_alle1is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, @@ -4407,7 +4383,7 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_alle3is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, { CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); - tlb_flush_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3); + tlb_flush_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3); } static void tlbi_aa64_vae2_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, @@ -4435,7 +4411,7 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_vae3_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu); uint64_t pageaddr = sextract64(value << 12, 0, 56); - tlb_flush_page_by_mmuidx(cs, pageaddr, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3); + tlb_flush_page_by_mmuidx(cs, pageaddr, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3); } static void tlbi_aa64_vae1is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, @@ -4474,12 +4450,10 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_vae2is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, { CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); uint64_t pageaddr = sextract64(value << 12, 0, 56); - bool secure = arm_is_secure_below_el3(env); - int mask = secure ? ARMMMUIdxBit_SE2 : ARMMMUIdxBit_E2; - int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE2 : ARMMMUIdx_E2, - pageaddr); + int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, ARMMMUIdx_E2, pageaddr); - tlb_flush_page_bits_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, pageaddr, mask, bits); + tlb_flush_page_bits_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, pageaddr, + ARMMMUIdxBit_E2, bits); } static void tlbi_aa64_vae3is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, @@ -4487,10 +4461,10 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_vae3is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, { CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env); uint64_t pageaddr = sextract64(value << 12, 0, 56); - int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, ARMMMUIdx_SE3, pageaddr); + int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, ARMMMUIdx_E3, pageaddr); tlb_flush_page_bits_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, pageaddr, - ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3, bits); + ARMMMUIdxBit_E3, bits); } #ifdef TARGET_AARCH64 @@ -4596,8 +4570,7 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_rvae1is_write(CPUARMState *env, static int vae2_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env) { - return (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) - ? ARMMMUIdxBit_SE2 : ARMMMUIdxBit_E2); + return ARMMMUIdxBit_E2; } static void tlbi_aa64_rvae2_write(CPUARMState *env, @@ -4643,8 +4616,7 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_rvae3_write(CPUARMState *env, * flush-last-level-only. */ - do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3, - tlb_force_broadcast(env)); + do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3, tlb_force_broadcast(env)); } static void tlbi_aa64_rvae3is_write(CPUARMState *env, @@ -4658,7 +4630,7 @@ static void tlbi_aa64_rvae3is_write(CPUARMState *env, * flush-last-level-only or inner/outer specific flushes. */ - do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3, true); + do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3, true); } #endif @@ -10271,8 +10243,7 @@ uint64_t arm_sctlr(CPUARMState *env, int el) /* Only EL0 needs to be adjusted for EL1&0 or EL2&0. */ if (el == 0) { ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = arm_mmu_idx_el(env, 0); - el = (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0) - ? 2 : 1; + el = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 ? 2 : 1; } return env->cp15.sctlr_el[el]; } @@ -10816,22 +10787,15 @@ int arm_mmu_idx_to_el(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) switch (mmu_idx) { case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: return 0; case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: return 1; case ARMMMUIdx_E2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: return 2; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE3: + case ARMMMUIdx_E3: return 3; default: g_assert_not_reached(); @@ -10884,15 +10848,11 @@ ARMMMUIdx arm_mmu_idx_el(CPUARMState *env, int el) } break; case 3: - return ARMMMUIdx_SE3; + return ARMMMUIdx_E3; default: g_assert_not_reached(); } - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - idx &= ~ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS; - } - return idx; } @@ -11095,15 +11055,11 @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a64(CPUARMState *env, int el, int fp_el, switch (mmu_idx) { case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: /* TODO: ARMv8.3-NV */ DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, UNPRIV, 1); break; case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: /* * Note that EL20_2 is gated by HCR_EL2.E2H == 1, but EL20_0 is * gated by HCR_EL2. == '11', and so is LDTR. diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index 14428730d4..b509d70851 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -649,21 +649,12 @@ static inline bool regime_has_2_ranges(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: return true; default: return false; @@ -674,11 +665,8 @@ static inline bool regime_is_pan(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) { switch (mmu_idx) { case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: return true; default: return false; @@ -689,30 +677,20 @@ static inline bool regime_is_pan(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) static inline uint32_t regime_el(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) { switch (mmu_idx) { - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE2: case ARMMMUIdx_E2: return 2; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE3: + case ARMMMUIdx_E3: return 3; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0: - return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) ? 1 : 3; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: + return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) || !arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) ? 1 : 3; case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri: @@ -954,9 +932,6 @@ static inline bool arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN: return true; default: return false; diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 55e8f33c50..2055d684e6 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -65,12 +65,6 @@ unsigned int arm_pamax(ARMCPU *cpu) ARMMMUIdx stage_1_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) { switch (mmu_idx) { - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: - return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: - return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN; case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0; case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: @@ -95,11 +89,8 @@ static bool regime_translation_big_endian(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) static bool regime_is_user(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) { switch (mmu_idx) { - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0: case ARMMMUIdx_MUser: case ARMMMUIdx_MSUser: case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri: @@ -2304,7 +2295,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, s2_mmu_idx = (s2walk_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2); - is_el0 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0; + is_el0 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_0; /* * S1 is done, now do S2 translation. @@ -2511,6 +2502,8 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: case ARMMMUIdx_E2: + is_secure = arm_is_secure_below_el3(env); + break; case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri: case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri: @@ -2518,17 +2511,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, case ARMMMUIdx_MUser: is_secure = false; break; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE3: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1: - case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE2: + case ARMMMUIdx_E3: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S: case ARMMMUIdx_MSPrivNegPri: case ARMMMUIdx_MSUserNegPri: diff --git a/target/arm/translate-a64.c b/target/arm/translate-a64.c index 78b2d91ed4..5b67375f4e 100644 --- a/target/arm/translate-a64.c +++ b/target/arm/translate-a64.c @@ -111,14 +111,6 @@ static int get_a64_user_mem_index(DisasContext *s) case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: useridx = ARMMMUIdx_E20_0; break; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: - useridx = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0; - break; - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN: - useridx = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0; - break; default: g_assert_not_reached(); } diff --git a/target/arm/translate.c b/target/arm/translate.c index ac647e0262..2f72afe019 100644 --- a/target/arm/translate.c +++ b/target/arm/translate.c @@ -237,16 +237,12 @@ static inline int get_a32_user_mem_index(DisasContext *s) * otherwise, access as if at PL0. */ switch (s->mmu_idx) { + case ARMMMUIdx_E3: case ARMMMUIdx_E2: /* this one is UNPREDICTABLE */ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: return arm_to_core_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx_E10_0); - case ARMMMUIdx_SE3: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1: - case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN: - return arm_to_core_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0); case ARMMMUIdx_MUser: case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv: return arm_to_core_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx_MUser); From 3b2af99313504b65f582e034cf505fea839984e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 15/28] target/arm: Reorg regime_translation_disabled Use a switch on mmu_idx for the a-profile indexes, instead of three different if's vs regime_el and arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-12-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 2055d684e6..a514a78c92 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -148,21 +148,39 @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env); - if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) { + switch (mmu_idx) { + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S: /* HCR.DC means HCR.VM behaves as 1 */ return (hcr_el2 & (HCR_DC | HCR_VM)) == 0; - } - if (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE) { + case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: + case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: + case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: /* TGE means that NS EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */ - if (!is_secure && regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) { + if (!is_secure && (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) { return true; } - } + break; - if ((hcr_el2 & HCR_DC) && arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx)) { + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1: + case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN: /* HCR.DC means SCTLR_EL1.M behaves as 0 */ - return true; + if (hcr_el2 & HCR_DC) { + return true; + } + break; + + case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0: + case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2: + case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN: + case ARMMMUIdx_E2: + case ARMMMUIdx_E3: + break; + + default: + g_assert_not_reached(); } return (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_M) == 0; From fdf12933390119a06cfb74dc892c5ce868b6a963 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 16/28] target/arm: Drop secure check for HCR.TGE vs SCTLR_EL1.M The effect of TGE does not only apply to non-secure state, now that Secure EL2 exists. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-13-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index a514a78c92..b3e0db1936 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1: case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN: - /* TGE means that NS EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */ - if (!is_secure && (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) { + /* TGE means that EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */ + if (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE) { return true; } break; From b74c04431d0afac930634794c8a7b74ec0d8572b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 17/28] target/arm: Introduce arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate For page walking, we may require HCR for a security state that is not "current". Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-14-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/cpu.h | 20 +++++++++++++------- target/arm/helper.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h index 53f4c236e1..d541392170 100644 --- a/target/arm/cpu.h +++ b/target/arm/cpu.h @@ -2412,15 +2412,15 @@ static inline bool arm_is_secure(CPUARMState *env) * Return true if the current security state has AArch64 EL2 or AArch32 Hyp. * This corresponds to the pseudocode EL2Enabled() */ +static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure) +{ + return arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL2) + && (!secure || (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_EEL2)); +} + static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled(CPUARMState *env) { - if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL2)) { - if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { - return (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_EEL2) != 0; - } - return true; - } - return false; + return arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(env, arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)); } #else @@ -2434,6 +2434,11 @@ static inline bool arm_is_secure(CPUARMState *env) return false; } +static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure) +{ + return false; +} + static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled(CPUARMState *env) { return false; @@ -2446,6 +2451,7 @@ static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled(CPUARMState *env) * "for all purposes other than a direct read or write access of HCR_EL2." * Not included here is HCR_RW. */ +uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure); uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env); uint64_t arm_hcrx_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env); diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index b1b8725628..f1266bb157 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -5229,15 +5229,15 @@ static void hcr_writelow(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, } /* - * Return the effective value of HCR_EL2. + * Return the effective value of HCR_EL2, at the given security state. * Bits that are not included here: * RW (read from SCR_EL3.RW as needed) */ -uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env) +uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure) { uint64_t ret = env->cp15.hcr_el2; - if (!arm_is_el2_enabled(env)) { + if (!arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(env, secure)) { /* * "This register has no effect if EL2 is not enabled in the * current Security state". This is ARMv8.4-SecEL2 speak for @@ -5296,6 +5296,11 @@ uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env) return ret; } +uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env) +{ + return arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)); +} + /* * Corresponds to ARM pseudocode function ELIsInHost(). */ From ab1f78859dd711fed72b1aeb7e46e05b0273a017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 18/28] target/arm: Hoist read of *is_secure in S1_ptw_translate Rename the argument to is_secure_ptr, and introduce a local variable is_secure with the value. We only write back to the pointer toward the end of the function. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-15-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index b3e0db1936..b40b4586f8 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -207,24 +207,25 @@ static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(CPUARMState *env, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs) /* Translate a S1 pagetable walk through S2 if needed. */ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, - hwaddr addr, bool *is_secure, + hwaddr addr, bool *is_secure_ptr, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) { - ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2; + bool is_secure = *is_secure_ptr; + ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2; if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) && - !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, *is_secure)) { + !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, is_secure)) { GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {}; int ret; ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx, - *is_secure, false, &s2, fi); + is_secure, false, &s2, fi); if (ret) { assert(fi->type != ARMFault_None); fi->s2addr = addr; fi->stage2 = true; fi->s1ptw = true; - fi->s1ns = !*is_secure; + fi->s1ns = !is_secure; return ~0; } if ((arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_PTW) && @@ -237,19 +238,20 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, fi->s2addr = addr; fi->stage2 = true; fi->s1ptw = true; - fi->s1ns = !*is_secure; + fi->s1ns = !is_secure; return ~0; } if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) { /* Check if page table walk is to secure or non-secure PA space. */ - if (*is_secure) { - *is_secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW); + if (is_secure) { + is_secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW); } else { - *is_secure = !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW); + is_secure = !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW); } + *is_secure_ptr = is_secure; } else { - assert(!*is_secure); + assert(!is_secure); } addr = s2.phys; From 72cef09caa2ce23324777676979c62bbdd02cb35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 19/28] target/arm: Remove env argument from combined_attrs_fwb This value is unused. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-16-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index b40b4586f8..7d607c2e7b 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -2172,8 +2172,7 @@ static uint8_t force_cacheattr_nibble_wb(uint8_t attr) * s1 and s2 for the HCR_EL2.FWB == 1 case, returning the * combined attributes in MAIR_EL1 format. */ -static uint8_t combined_attrs_fwb(CPUARMState *env, - ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2) +static uint8_t combined_attrs_fwb(ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2) { switch (s2.attrs) { case 7: @@ -2246,7 +2245,7 @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env, /* Combine memory type and cacheability attributes */ if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_FWB) { - ret.attrs = combined_attrs_fwb(env, s1, s2); + ret.attrs = combined_attrs_fwb(s1, s2); } else { ret.attrs = combined_attrs_nofwb(env, s1, s2); } From ac76c2e508871e8180780338aa035c67ece75888 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 20/28] target/arm: Pass HCR to attribute subroutines. These subroutines did not need ENV for anything except retrieving the effective value of HCR anyway. We have computed the effective value of HCR in the callers, and this will be especially important for interpreting HCR in a non-current security state. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-17-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 7d607c2e7b..b4fd4d3fac 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, return (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_M) == 0; } -static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(CPUARMState *env, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs) +static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(uint64_t hcr, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs) { /* * For an S1 page table walk, the stage 1 attributes are always @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(CPUARMState *env, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs) * when cacheattrs.attrs bit [2] is 0. */ assert(cacheattrs.is_s2_format); - if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_FWB) { + if (hcr & HCR_FWB) { return (cacheattrs.attrs & 0x4) == 0; } else { return (cacheattrs.attrs & 0xc) == 0; @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) && !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, is_secure)) { GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {}; + uint64_t hcr; int ret; ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx, @@ -228,8 +229,9 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, fi->s1ns = !is_secure; return ~0; } - if ((arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_PTW) && - ptw_attrs_are_device(env, s2.cacheattrs)) { + + hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env); + if ((hcr & HCR_PTW) && ptw_attrs_are_device(hcr, s2.cacheattrs)) { /* * PTW set and S1 walk touched S2 Device memory: * generate Permission fault. @@ -2059,14 +2061,14 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, * ref: shared/translation/attrs/S2AttrDecode() * .../S2ConvertAttrsHints() */ -static uint8_t convert_stage2_attrs(CPUARMState *env, uint8_t s2attrs) +static uint8_t convert_stage2_attrs(uint64_t hcr, uint8_t s2attrs) { uint8_t hiattr = extract32(s2attrs, 2, 2); uint8_t loattr = extract32(s2attrs, 0, 2); uint8_t hihint = 0, lohint = 0; if (hiattr != 0) { /* normal memory */ - if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_CD) { /* cache disabled */ + if (hcr & HCR_CD) { /* cache disabled */ hiattr = loattr = 1; /* non-cacheable */ } else { if (hiattr != 1) { /* Write-through or write-back */ @@ -2112,12 +2114,12 @@ static uint8_t combine_cacheattr_nibble(uint8_t s1, uint8_t s2) * s1 and s2 for the HCR_EL2.FWB == 0 case, returning the * combined attributes in MAIR_EL1 format. */ -static uint8_t combined_attrs_nofwb(CPUARMState *env, +static uint8_t combined_attrs_nofwb(uint64_t hcr, ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2) { uint8_t s1lo, s2lo, s1hi, s2hi, s2_mair_attrs, ret_attrs; - s2_mair_attrs = convert_stage2_attrs(env, s2.attrs); + s2_mair_attrs = convert_stage2_attrs(hcr, s2.attrs); s1lo = extract32(s1.attrs, 0, 4); s2lo = extract32(s2_mair_attrs, 0, 4); @@ -2217,7 +2219,7 @@ static uint8_t combined_attrs_fwb(ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2) * @s1: Attributes from stage 1 walk * @s2: Attributes from stage 2 walk */ -static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env, +static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(uint64_t hcr, ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2) { ARMCacheAttrs ret; @@ -2244,10 +2246,10 @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env, } /* Combine memory type and cacheability attributes */ - if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_FWB) { + if (hcr & HCR_FWB) { ret.attrs = combined_attrs_fwb(s1, s2); } else { - ret.attrs = combined_attrs_nofwb(env, s1, s2); + ret.attrs = combined_attrs_nofwb(hcr, s1, s2); } /* @@ -2290,6 +2292,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs1; ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx; bool is_el0; + uint64_t hcr; ret = get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type, s1_mmu_idx, is_secure, result, fi); @@ -2338,7 +2341,8 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, } /* Combine the S1 and S2 cache attributes. */ - if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_DC) { + hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env); + if (hcr & HCR_DC) { /* * HCR.DC forces the first stage attributes to * Normal Non-Shareable, @@ -2351,7 +2355,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, } cacheattrs1.shareability = 0; } - result->cacheattrs = combine_cacheattrs(env, cacheattrs1, + result->cacheattrs = combine_cacheattrs(hcr, cacheattrs1, result->cacheattrs); /* From 2189c79858a9eadd85851afc2369d8679ecd563a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 21/28] target/arm: Fix ATS12NSO* from S PL1 Use arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate instead of arm_hcr_el2_eff, so that we use is_secure instead of the current security state. These AT* operations have been broken since arm_hcr_el2_eff gained a check for "el2 enabled" for Secure EL2. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-18-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index b4fd4d3fac..a589cec8e3 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, } } - hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env); + hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); switch (mmu_idx) { case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, return ~0; } - hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env); + hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); if ((hcr & HCR_PTW) && ptw_attrs_are_device(hcr, s2.cacheattrs)) { /* * PTW set and S1 walk touched S2 Device memory: @@ -2341,7 +2341,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, } /* Combine the S1 and S2 cache attributes. */ - hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env); + hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); if (hcr & HCR_DC) { /* * HCR.DC forces the first stage attributes to @@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */ - hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env); + hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0; result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false; if (hcr & HCR_DC) { From 448e42fdc1013b3497c9a6902f8052488fc8af1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 22/28] target/arm: Split out get_phys_addr_disabled Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-19-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index a589cec8e3..96ab99c7b6 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -2272,6 +2272,78 @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(uint64_t hcr, return ret; } +/* + * MMU disabled. S1 addresses within aa64 translation regimes are + * still checked for bounds -- see AArch64.S1DisabledOutput(). + */ +static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, + MMUAccessType access_type, + ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_secure, + GetPhysAddrResult *result, + ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) +{ + uint64_t hcr; + uint8_t memattr; + + if (mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) { + int r_el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx); + if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, r_el)) { + int pamax = arm_pamax(env_archcpu(env)); + uint64_t tcr = env->cp15.tcr_el[r_el]; + int addrtop, tbi; + + tbi = aa64_va_parameter_tbi(tcr, mmu_idx); + if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { + tbi &= ~aa64_va_parameter_tbid(tcr, mmu_idx); + } + tbi = (tbi >> extract64(address, 55, 1)) & 1; + addrtop = (tbi ? 55 : 63); + + if (extract64(address, pamax, addrtop - pamax + 1) != 0) { + fi->type = ARMFault_AddressSize; + fi->level = 0; + fi->stage2 = false; + return 1; + } + + /* + * When TBI is disabled, we've just validated that all of the + * bits above PAMax are zero, so logically we only need to + * clear the top byte for TBI. But it's clearer to follow + * the pseudocode set of addrdesc.paddress. + */ + address = extract64(address, 0, 52); + } + } + + result->phys = address; + result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; + result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; + + /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */ + hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); + result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0; + result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false; + if (hcr & HCR_DC) { + if (hcr & HCR_DCT) { + memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */ + } else { + memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */ + } + } else if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { + if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) { + memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */ + } else { + memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */ + } + result->cacheattrs.shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */ + } else { + memattr = 0x00; /* Device, nGnRnE */ + } + result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr; + return 0; +} + bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result, @@ -2431,71 +2503,9 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, /* Definitely a real MMU, not an MPU */ if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) { - uint64_t hcr; - uint8_t memattr; - - /* - * MMU disabled. S1 addresses within aa64 translation regimes are - * still checked for bounds -- see AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. - */ - if (mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) { - int r_el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx); - if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, r_el)) { - int pamax = arm_pamax(env_archcpu(env)); - uint64_t tcr = env->cp15.tcr_el[r_el]; - int addrtop, tbi; - - tbi = aa64_va_parameter_tbi(tcr, mmu_idx); - if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { - tbi &= ~aa64_va_parameter_tbid(tcr, mmu_idx); - } - tbi = (tbi >> extract64(address, 55, 1)) & 1; - addrtop = (tbi ? 55 : 63); - - if (extract64(address, pamax, addrtop - pamax + 1) != 0) { - fi->type = ARMFault_AddressSize; - fi->level = 0; - fi->stage2 = false; - return 1; - } - - /* - * When TBI is disabled, we've just validated that all of the - * bits above PAMax are zero, so logically we only need to - * clear the top byte for TBI. But it's clearer to follow - * the pseudocode set of addrdesc.paddress. - */ - address = extract64(address, 0, 52); - } - } - result->phys = address; - result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; - result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; - - /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */ - hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); - result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0; - result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false; - if (hcr & HCR_DC) { - if (hcr & HCR_DCT) { - memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */ - } else { - memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */ - } - } else if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { - if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) { - memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */ - } else { - memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */ - } - result->cacheattrs.shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */ - } else { - memattr = 0x00; /* Device, nGnRnE */ - } - result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr; - return 0; + return get_phys_addr_disabled(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, + is_secure, result, fi); } - if (regime_using_lpae_format(env, mmu_idx)) { return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, is_secure, false, result, fi); From 5b74f9b4ed9033dc5427cd69f5ee37e7b726ecfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 23/28] target/arm: Fix cacheattr in get_phys_addr_disabled Do not apply memattr or shareability for Stage2 translations. Make sure to apply HCR_{DC,DCT} only to Regime_EL10, per the pseudocode in AArch64.S1DisabledOutput. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-20-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/ptw.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 96ab99c7b6..15c37b52c9 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -2282,11 +2282,12 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi) { - uint64_t hcr; - uint8_t memattr; + uint8_t memattr = 0x00; /* Device nGnRnE */ + uint8_t shareability = 0; /* non-sharable */ if (mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) { int r_el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx); + if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, r_el)) { int pamax = arm_pamax(env_archcpu(env)); uint64_t tcr = env->cp15.tcr_el[r_el]; @@ -2314,32 +2315,33 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, */ address = extract64(address, 0, 52); } + + /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */ + if (r_el == 1) { + uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); + if (hcr & HCR_DC) { + if (hcr & HCR_DCT) { + memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */ + } else { + memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */ + } + } + } + if (memattr == 0 && access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { + if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) { + memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */ + } else { + memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */ + } + shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */ + } + result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false; } result->phys = address; result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; - - /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */ - hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure); - result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0; - result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false; - if (hcr & HCR_DC) { - if (hcr & HCR_DCT) { - memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */ - } else { - memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */ - } - } else if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { - if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) { - memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */ - } else { - memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */ - } - result->cacheattrs.shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */ - } else { - memattr = 0x00; /* Device, nGnRnE */ - } + result->cacheattrs.shareability = shareability; result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr; return 0; } From 7fa7ea8f480cd6f3f5f2a9453eea5733510b6c8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Henderson Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2022 09:22:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 24/28] target/arm: Use tlb_set_page_full Adjust GetPhysAddrResult to fill in CPUTLBEntryFull, so that it may be passed directly to tlb_set_page_full. The change is large, but mostly mechanical. The major non-mechanical change is page_size -> lg_page_size. Most of the time this is obvious, and is related to TARGET_PAGE_BITS. Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-21-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- target/arm/helper.c | 12 +-- target/arm/internals.h | 5 +- target/arm/m_helper.c | 20 ++--- target/arm/ptw.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- target/arm/tlb_helper.c | 9 +- 5 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index f1266bb157..e1338ed6e2 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -3323,8 +3323,8 @@ static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value, /* Create a 64-bit PAR */ par64 = (1 << 11); /* LPAE bit always set */ if (!ret) { - par64 |= res.phys & ~0xfffULL; - if (!res.attrs.secure) { + par64 |= res.f.phys_addr & ~0xfffULL; + if (!res.f.attrs.secure) { par64 |= (1 << 9); /* NS */ } par64 |= (uint64_t)res.cacheattrs.attrs << 56; /* ATTR */ @@ -3348,13 +3348,13 @@ static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value, */ if (!ret) { /* We do not set any attribute bits in the PAR */ - if (res.page_size == (1 << 24) + if (res.f.lg_page_size == 24 && arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) { - par64 = (res.phys & 0xff000000) | (1 << 1); + par64 = (res.f.phys_addr & 0xff000000) | (1 << 1); } else { - par64 = res.phys & 0xfffff000; + par64 = res.f.phys_addr & 0xfffff000; } - if (!res.attrs.secure) { + if (!res.f.attrs.secure) { par64 |= (1 << 9); /* NS */ } } else { diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index b509d70851..fd17aee459 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -1071,10 +1071,7 @@ typedef struct ARMCacheAttrs { /* Fields that are valid upon success. */ typedef struct GetPhysAddrResult { - hwaddr phys; - target_ulong page_size; - int prot; - MemTxAttrs attrs; + CPUTLBEntryFull f; ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs; } GetPhysAddrResult; diff --git a/target/arm/m_helper.c b/target/arm/m_helper.c index 203ba411f6..355cd4d60a 100644 --- a/target/arm/m_helper.c +++ b/target/arm/m_helper.c @@ -223,8 +223,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_write(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t addr, uint32_t value, } goto pend_fault; } - address_space_stl_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys, value, - res.attrs, &txres); + address_space_stl_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs), res.f.phys_addr, + value, res.f.attrs, &txres); if (txres != MEMTX_OK) { /* BusFault trying to write the data */ if (mode == STACK_LAZYFP) { @@ -298,8 +298,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_read(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t *dest, uint32_t addr, goto pend_fault; } - value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys, - res.attrs, &txres); + value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs), + res.f.phys_addr, res.f.attrs, &txres); if (txres != MEMTX_OK) { /* BusFault trying to read the data */ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...BusFault with BFSR.UNSTKERR\n"); @@ -2022,8 +2022,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool secure, qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...really MemManage with CFSR.IACCVIOL\n"); return false; } - *insn = address_space_lduw_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys, - res.attrs, &txres); + *insn = address_space_lduw_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs), + res.f.phys_addr, res.f.attrs, &txres); if (txres != MEMTX_OK) { env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_NS] |= R_V7M_CFSR_IBUSERR_MASK; armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS, false); @@ -2069,8 +2069,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_sg_stack_word(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, } return false; } - value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys, - res.attrs, &txres); + value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs), + res.f.phys_addr, res.f.attrs, &txres); if (txres != MEMTX_OK) { /* BusFault trying to read the data */ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, @@ -2817,8 +2817,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op) } else { mrvalid = true; } - r = res.prot & PAGE_READ; - rw = res.prot & PAGE_WRITE; + r = res.f.prot & PAGE_READ; + rw = res.f.prot & PAGE_WRITE; } else { r = false; rw = false; diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index 15c37b52c9..ddacffa7ee 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, assert(!is_secure); } - addr = s2.phys; + addr = s2.f.phys_addr; } return addr; } @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, /* 1Mb section. */ phys_addr = (desc & 0xfff00000) | (address & 0x000fffff); ap = (desc >> 10) & 3; - result->page_size = 1024 * 1024; + result->f.lg_page_size = 20; /* 1MB */ } else { /* Lookup l2 entry. */ if (type == 1) { @@ -497,12 +497,12 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, case 1: /* 64k page. */ phys_addr = (desc & 0xffff0000) | (address & 0xffff); ap = (desc >> (4 + ((address >> 13) & 6))) & 3; - result->page_size = 0x10000; + result->f.lg_page_size = 16; break; case 2: /* 4k page. */ phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff); ap = (desc >> (4 + ((address >> 9) & 6))) & 3; - result->page_size = 0x1000; + result->f.lg_page_size = 12; break; case 3: /* 1k page, or ARMv6/XScale "extended small (4k) page" */ if (type == 1) { @@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_XSCALE) || arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V6)) { phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff); - result->page_size = 0x1000; + result->f.lg_page_size = 12; } else { /* * UNPREDICTABLE in ARMv5; we choose to take a @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, } } else { phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffffc00) | (address & 0x3ff); - result->page_size = 0x400; + result->f.lg_page_size = 10; } ap = (desc >> 4) & 3; break; @@ -530,14 +530,14 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, g_assert_not_reached(); } } - result->prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot); - result->prot |= result->prot ? PAGE_EXEC : 0; - if (!(result->prot & (1 << access_type))) { + result->f.prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot); + result->f.prot |= result->f.prot ? PAGE_EXEC : 0; + if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) { /* Access permission fault. */ fi->type = ARMFault_Permission; goto do_fault; } - result->phys = phys_addr; + result->f.phys_addr = phys_addr; return false; do_fault: fi->domain = domain; @@ -607,11 +607,11 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, phys_addr = (desc & 0xff000000) | (address & 0x00ffffff); phys_addr |= (uint64_t)extract32(desc, 20, 4) << 32; phys_addr |= (uint64_t)extract32(desc, 5, 4) << 36; - result->page_size = 0x1000000; + result->f.lg_page_size = 24; /* 16MB */ } else { /* Section. */ phys_addr = (desc & 0xfff00000) | (address & 0x000fffff); - result->page_size = 0x100000; + result->f.lg_page_size = 20; /* 1MB */ } ap = ((desc >> 10) & 3) | ((desc >> 13) & 4); xn = desc & (1 << 4); @@ -636,12 +636,12 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, case 1: /* 64k page. */ phys_addr = (desc & 0xffff0000) | (address & 0xffff); xn = desc & (1 << 15); - result->page_size = 0x10000; + result->f.lg_page_size = 16; break; case 2: case 3: /* 4k page. */ phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff); xn = desc & 1; - result->page_size = 0x1000; + result->f.lg_page_size = 12; break; default: /* Never happens, but compiler isn't smart enough to tell. */ @@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, } } if (domain_prot == 3) { - result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; } else { if (pxn && !regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx)) { xn = 1; @@ -667,14 +667,14 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, fi->type = ARMFault_AccessFlag; goto do_fault; } - result->prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap >> 1); + result->f.prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap >> 1); } else { - result->prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot); + result->f.prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot); } - if (result->prot && !xn) { - result->prot |= PAGE_EXEC; + if (result->f.prot && !xn) { + result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC; } - if (!(result->prot & (1 << access_type))) { + if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) { /* Access permission fault. */ fi->type = ARMFault_Permission; goto do_fault; @@ -685,9 +685,9 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, * the CPU doesn't support TZ or this is a non-secure translation * regime, because the attribute will already be non-secure. */ - result->attrs.secure = false; + result->f.attrs.secure = false; } - result->phys = phys_addr; + result->f.phys_addr = phys_addr; return false; do_fault: fi->domain = domain; @@ -1298,16 +1298,16 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address, if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) { ns = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2; xn = extract32(attrs, 11, 2); - result->prot = get_S2prot(env, ap, xn, s1_is_el0); + result->f.prot = get_S2prot(env, ap, xn, s1_is_el0); } else { ns = extract32(attrs, 3, 1); xn = extract32(attrs, 12, 1); pxn = extract32(attrs, 11, 1); - result->prot = get_S1prot(env, mmu_idx, aarch64, ap, ns, xn, pxn); + result->f.prot = get_S1prot(env, mmu_idx, aarch64, ap, ns, xn, pxn); } fault_type = ARMFault_Permission; - if (!(result->prot & (1 << access_type))) { + if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) { goto do_fault; } @@ -1317,11 +1317,11 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address, * the CPU doesn't support TZ or this is a non-secure translation * regime, because the attribute will already be non-secure. */ - result->attrs.secure = false; + result->f.attrs.secure = false; } /* When in aarch64 mode, and BTI is enabled, remember GP in the IOTLB. */ if (aarch64 && guarded && cpu_isar_feature(aa64_bti, cpu)) { - arm_tlb_bti_gp(&result->attrs) = true; + arm_tlb_bti_gp(&result->f.attrs) = true; } if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) { @@ -1347,8 +1347,8 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address, result->cacheattrs.shareability = extract32(attrs, 6, 2); } - result->phys = descaddr; - result->page_size = page_size; + result->f.phys_addr = descaddr; + result->f.lg_page_size = ctz64(page_size); return false; do_fault: @@ -1373,12 +1373,12 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) { /* MPU disabled. */ - result->phys = address; - result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.phys_addr = address; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; return false; } - result->phys = address; + result->f.phys_addr = address; for (n = 7; n >= 0; n--) { base = env->cp15.c6_region[n]; if ((base & 1) == 0) { @@ -1414,16 +1414,16 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, fi->level = 1; return true; } - result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE; break; case 2: - result->prot = PAGE_READ; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ; if (!is_user) { - result->prot |= PAGE_WRITE; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE; } break; case 3: - result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE; break; case 5: if (is_user) { @@ -1431,10 +1431,10 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, fi->level = 1; return true; } - result->prot = PAGE_READ; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ; break; case 6: - result->prot = PAGE_READ; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ; break; default: /* Bad permission. */ @@ -1442,12 +1442,12 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, fi->level = 1; return true; } - result->prot |= PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC; return false; } static void get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, - int32_t address, int *prot) + int32_t address, uint8_t *prot) { if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) { *prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE; @@ -1531,9 +1531,9 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, int n; bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx); - result->phys = address; - result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; - result->prot = 0; + result->f.phys_addr = address; + result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS; + result->f.prot = 0; if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure) || m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) { @@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, * which always does a direct read using address_space_ldl(), rather * than going via this function, so we don't need to check that here. */ - get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->prot); + get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->f.prot); } else { /* MPU enabled */ for (n = (int)cpu->pmsav7_dregion - 1; n >= 0; n--) { /* region search */ @@ -1587,7 +1587,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, if (ranges_overlap(base, rmask, address & TARGET_PAGE_MASK, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) { - result->page_size = 1; + result->f.lg_page_size = 0; } continue; } @@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, continue; } if (rsize < TARGET_PAGE_BITS) { - result->page_size = 1 << rsize; + result->f.lg_page_size = rsize; } break; } @@ -1636,7 +1636,8 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, fi->type = ARMFault_Background; return true; } - get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->prot); + get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, + &result->f.prot); } else { /* a MPU hit! */ uint32_t ap = extract32(env->pmsav7.dracr[n], 8, 3); uint32_t xn = extract32(env->pmsav7.dracr[n], 12, 1); @@ -1653,16 +1654,16 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, case 5: break; /* no access */ case 3: - result->prot |= PAGE_WRITE; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE; /* fall through */ case 2: case 6: - result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; break; case 7: /* for v7M, same as 6; for R profile a reserved value */ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) { - result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; break; } /* fall through */ @@ -1678,16 +1679,16 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, case 1: case 2: case 3: - result->prot |= PAGE_WRITE; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE; /* fall through */ case 5: case 6: - result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; break; case 7: /* for v7M, same as 6; for R profile a reserved value */ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) { - result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC; break; } /* fall through */ @@ -1700,14 +1701,14 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, /* execute never */ if (xn) { - result->prot &= ~PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot &= ~PAGE_EXEC; } } } fi->type = ARMFault_Permission; fi->level = 1; - return !(result->prot & (1 << access_type)); + return !(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type)); } bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, @@ -1733,9 +1734,9 @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, uint32_t addr_page_base = address & TARGET_PAGE_MASK; uint32_t addr_page_limit = addr_page_base + (TARGET_PAGE_SIZE - 1); - result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; - result->phys = address; - result->prot = 0; + result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS; + result->f.phys_addr = address; + result->f.prot = 0; if (mregion) { *mregion = -1; } @@ -1785,13 +1786,13 @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, ranges_overlap(base, limit - base + 1, addr_page_base, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) { - result->page_size = 1; + result->f.lg_page_size = 0; } continue; } if (base > addr_page_base || limit < addr_page_limit) { - result->page_size = 1; + result->f.lg_page_size = 0; } if (matchregion != -1) { @@ -1817,7 +1818,7 @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, if (matchregion == -1) { /* hit using the background region */ - get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->prot); + get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->f.prot); } else { uint32_t ap = extract32(env->pmsav8.rbar[secure][matchregion], 1, 2); uint32_t xn = extract32(env->pmsav8.rbar[secure][matchregion], 0, 1); @@ -1832,9 +1833,9 @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, xn = 1; } - result->prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap); - if (result->prot && !xn && !(pxn && !is_user)) { - result->prot |= PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap); + if (result->f.prot && !xn && !(pxn && !is_user)) { + result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC; } /* * We don't need to look the attribute up in the MAIR0/MAIR1 @@ -1847,7 +1848,7 @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, fi->type = ARMFault_Permission; fi->level = 1; - return !(result->prot & (1 << access_type)); + return !(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type)); } static bool v8m_is_sau_exempt(CPUARMState *env, @@ -2011,9 +2012,9 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, } else { fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault; } - result->page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 1 : TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; - result->phys = address; - result->prot = 0; + result->f.lg_page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 0 : TARGET_PAGE_BITS; + result->f.phys_addr = address; + result->f.prot = 0; return true; } } else { @@ -2023,7 +2024,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, * might downgrade a secure access to nonsecure. */ if (sattrs.ns) { - result->attrs.secure = false; + result->f.attrs.secure = false; } else if (!secure) { /* * NS access to S memory must fault. @@ -2036,9 +2037,9 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, * for M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT in arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(). */ fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault; - result->page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 1 : TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; - result->phys = address; - result->prot = 0; + result->f.lg_page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 0 : TARGET_PAGE_BITS; + result->f.phys_addr = address; + result->f.prot = 0; return true; } } @@ -2047,7 +2048,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, ret = pmsav8_mpu_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, secure, result, fi, NULL); if (sattrs.subpage) { - result->page_size = 1; + result->f.lg_page_size = 0; } return ret; } @@ -2338,9 +2339,9 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false; } - result->phys = address; - result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; - result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; + result->f.phys_addr = address; + result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC; + result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS; result->cacheattrs.shareability = shareability; result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr; return 0; @@ -2377,8 +2378,8 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, return ret; } - ipa = result->phys; - ipa_secure = result->attrs.secure; + ipa = result->f.phys_addr; + ipa_secure = result->f.attrs.secure; if (is_secure) { /* Select TCR based on the NS bit from the S1 walk. */ s2walk_secure = !(ipa_secure @@ -2398,7 +2399,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, * Save the stage1 results so that we may merge * prot and cacheattrs later. */ - s1_prot = result->prot; + s1_prot = result->f.prot; cacheattrs1 = result->cacheattrs; memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result)); @@ -2407,7 +2408,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, fi->s2addr = ipa; /* Combine the S1 and S2 perms. */ - result->prot &= s1_prot; + result->f.prot &= s1_prot; /* If S2 fails, return early. */ if (ret) { @@ -2436,7 +2437,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, * Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space. * Note that VSTCR overrides VTCR and {N}SW overrides {N}SA. */ - result->attrs.secure = + result->f.attrs.secure = (is_secure && !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW)) && (ipa_secure @@ -2456,8 +2457,8 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, * cannot upgrade an non-secure translation regime's attributes * to secure. */ - result->attrs.secure = is_secure; - result->attrs.user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx); + result->f.attrs.secure = is_secure; + result->f.attrs.user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx); /* * Fast Context Switch Extension. This doesn't exist at all in v8. @@ -2474,7 +2475,7 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_PMSA)) { bool ret; - result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; + result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS; if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) { /* PMSAv8 */ @@ -2495,9 +2496,9 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address, (access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE ? "writing" : "execute"), (uint32_t)address, mmu_idx, ret ? "Miss" : "Hit", - result->prot & PAGE_READ ? 'r' : '-', - result->prot & PAGE_WRITE ? 'w' : '-', - result->prot & PAGE_EXEC ? 'x' : '-'); + result->f.prot & PAGE_READ ? 'r' : '-', + result->f.prot & PAGE_WRITE ? 'w' : '-', + result->f.prot & PAGE_EXEC ? 'x' : '-'); return ret; } @@ -2572,10 +2573,10 @@ hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr, bool ret; ret = get_phys_addr(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, mmu_idx, &res, &fi); - *attrs = res.attrs; + *attrs = res.f.attrs; if (ret) { return -1; } - return res.phys; + return res.f.phys_addr; } diff --git a/target/arm/tlb_helper.c b/target/arm/tlb_helper.c index ad225b1cb2..49601394ec 100644 --- a/target/arm/tlb_helper.c +++ b/target/arm/tlb_helper.c @@ -227,17 +227,16 @@ bool arm_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int size, * target page size are handled specially, so for those we * pass in the exact addresses. */ - if (res.page_size >= TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) { - res.phys &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK; + if (res.f.lg_page_size >= TARGET_PAGE_BITS) { + res.f.phys_addr &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK; address &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK; } /* Notice and record tagged memory. */ if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_mte, cpu) && res.cacheattrs.attrs == 0xf0) { - arm_tlb_mte_tagged(&res.attrs) = true; + arm_tlb_mte_tagged(&res.f.attrs) = true; } - tlb_set_page_with_attrs(cs, address, res.phys, res.attrs, - res.prot, mmu_idx, res.page_size); + tlb_set_page_full(cs, mmu_idx, address, &res.f); return true; } else if (probe) { return false; From 0ff993193fe759b735e382fbe06b8258b537f95d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerome Forissier Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 16:56:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 25/28] hw/arm/boot: set CPTR_EL3.ESM and SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when booting Linux with EL3 According to the Linux kernel booting.rst [1], CPTR_EL3.ESM and SCR_EL3.EnTP2 must be initialized to 1 when EL3 is present and FEAT_SME is advertised. This has to be taken care of when QEMU boots directly into the kernel (i.e., "-M virt,secure=on -cpu max -kernel Image"). Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Fixes: 78cb9776662a ("target/arm: Enable SME for -cpu max") Link: [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/arm64/booting.rst?h=v6.0#n321 Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier Message-id: 20221003145641.1921467-1-jerome.forissier@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell --- hw/arm/boot.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/hw/arm/boot.c b/hw/arm/boot.c index ada2717f76..ee3858b673 100644 --- a/hw/arm/boot.c +++ b/hw/arm/boot.c @@ -763,6 +763,10 @@ static void do_cpu_reset(void *opaque) if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sve, cpu)) { env->cp15.cptr_el[3] |= R_CPTR_EL3_EZ_MASK; } + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sme, cpu)) { + env->cp15.cptr_el[3] |= R_CPTR_EL3_ESM_MASK; + env->cp15.scr_el3 |= SCR_ENTP2; + } /* AArch64 kernels never boot in secure mode */ assert(!info->secure_boot); /* This hook is only supported for AArch32 currently: From 104f703d93c9f12984a165985af653f83527c84e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Maydell Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 17:23:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 26/28] target/arm: Don't allow guest to use unimplemented granule sizes Arm CPUs support some subset of the granule (page) sizes 4K, 16K and 64K. The guest selects the one it wants using bits in the TCR_ELx registers. If it tries to program these registers with a value that is either reserved or which requests a size that the CPU does not implement, the architecture requires that the CPU behaves as if the field was programmed to some size that has been implemented. Currently we don't implement this, and instead let the guest use any granule size, even if the CPU ID register fields say it isn't present. Make aa64_va_parameters() check against the supported granule size and force use of a different one if it is not implemented. (A subsequent commit will make ARMVAParameters use the new enum rather than the current pair of using16k/using64k bools.) Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell Message-id: 20221003162315.2833797-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org --- target/arm/cpu.h | 33 +++++++++++++ target/arm/helper.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- target/arm/internals.h | 9 ++++ 3 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h index d541392170..1a909a1b43 100644 --- a/target/arm/cpu.h +++ b/target/arm/cpu.h @@ -4097,6 +4097,39 @@ static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran16_2_lpa2(const ARMISARegisters *id) return t >= 3 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran16_lpa2(id)); } +static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran4(const ARMISARegisters *id) +{ + return FIELD_SEX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN4) >= 0; +} + +static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran16(const ARMISARegisters *id) +{ + return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN16) >= 1; +} + +static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran64(const ARMISARegisters *id) +{ + return FIELD_SEX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN64) >= 0; +} + +static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran4_2(const ARMISARegisters *id) +{ + unsigned t = FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN4_2); + return t >= 2 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran4(id)); +} + +static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran16_2(const ARMISARegisters *id) +{ + unsigned t = FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN16_2); + return t >= 2 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran16(id)); +} + +static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran64_2(const ARMISARegisters *id) +{ + unsigned t = FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN64_2); + return t >= 2 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran64(id)); +} + static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_ccidx(const ARMISARegisters *id) { return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr2, ID_AA64MMFR2, CCIDX) != 0; diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index e1338ed6e2..d7f578f2ba 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -10287,20 +10287,105 @@ static int aa64_va_parameter_tcma(uint64_t tcr, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx) } } +static ARMGranuleSize tg0_to_gran_size(int tg) +{ + switch (tg) { + case 0: + return Gran4K; + case 1: + return Gran64K; + case 2: + return Gran16K; + default: + return GranInvalid; + } +} + +static ARMGranuleSize tg1_to_gran_size(int tg) +{ + switch (tg) { + case 1: + return Gran16K; + case 2: + return Gran4K; + case 3: + return Gran64K; + default: + return GranInvalid; + } +} + +static inline bool have4k(ARMCPU *cpu, bool stage2) +{ + return stage2 ? cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4_2, cpu) + : cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4, cpu); +} + +static inline bool have16k(ARMCPU *cpu, bool stage2) +{ + return stage2 ? cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16_2, cpu) + : cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16, cpu); +} + +static inline bool have64k(ARMCPU *cpu, bool stage2) +{ + return stage2 ? cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran64_2, cpu) + : cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran64, cpu); +} + +static ARMGranuleSize sanitize_gran_size(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMGranuleSize gran, + bool stage2) +{ + switch (gran) { + case Gran4K: + if (have4k(cpu, stage2)) { + return gran; + } + break; + case Gran16K: + if (have16k(cpu, stage2)) { + return gran; + } + break; + case Gran64K: + if (have64k(cpu, stage2)) { + return gran; + } + break; + case GranInvalid: + break; + } + /* + * If the guest selects a granule size that isn't implemented, + * the architecture requires that we behave as if it selected one + * that is (with an IMPDEF choice of which one to pick). We choose + * to implement the smallest supported granule size. + */ + if (have4k(cpu, stage2)) { + return Gran4K; + } + if (have16k(cpu, stage2)) { + return Gran16K; + } + assert(have64k(cpu, stage2)); + return Gran64K; +} + ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool data) { uint64_t tcr = regime_tcr(env, mmu_idx); bool epd, hpd, using16k, using64k, tsz_oob, ds; int select, tsz, tbi, max_tsz, min_tsz, ps, sh; + ARMGranuleSize gran; ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); + bool stage2 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S; if (!regime_has_2_ranges(mmu_idx)) { select = 0; tsz = extract32(tcr, 0, 6); - using64k = extract32(tcr, 14, 1); - using16k = extract32(tcr, 15, 1); - if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) { + gran = tg0_to_gran_size(extract32(tcr, 14, 2)); + if (stage2) { /* VTCR_EL2 */ hpd = false; } else { @@ -10318,16 +10403,13 @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, select = extract64(va, 55, 1); if (!select) { tsz = extract32(tcr, 0, 6); + gran = tg0_to_gran_size(extract32(tcr, 14, 2)); epd = extract32(tcr, 7, 1); sh = extract32(tcr, 12, 2); - using64k = extract32(tcr, 14, 1); - using16k = extract32(tcr, 15, 1); hpd = extract64(tcr, 41, 1); } else { - int tg = extract32(tcr, 30, 2); - using16k = tg == 1; - using64k = tg == 3; tsz = extract32(tcr, 16, 6); + gran = tg1_to_gran_size(extract32(tcr, 30, 2)); epd = extract32(tcr, 23, 1); sh = extract32(tcr, 28, 2); hpd = extract64(tcr, 42, 1); @@ -10336,6 +10418,10 @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, ds = extract64(tcr, 59, 1); } + gran = sanitize_gran_size(cpu, gran, stage2); + using64k = gran == Gran64K; + using16k = gran == Gran16K; + if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_st, cpu)) { max_tsz = 48 - using64k; } else { diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index fd17aee459..6166ac0a98 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -998,6 +998,15 @@ static inline uint32_t aarch64_pstate_valid_mask(const ARMISARegisters *id) return valid; } +/* Granule size (i.e. page size) */ +typedef enum ARMGranuleSize { + /* Same order as TG0 encoding */ + Gran4K, + Gran64K, + Gran16K, + GranInvalid, +} ARMGranuleSize; + /* * Parameters of a given virtual address, as extracted from the * translation control register (TCR) for a given regime. From 3c003f7029eb322c15f137b33af1120096e14f4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Maydell Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 17:23:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 27/28] target/arm: Use ARMGranuleSize in ARMVAParameters Now we have an enum for the granule size, use it in the ARMVAParameters struct instead of the using16k/using64k bools. Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson Message-id: 20221003162315.2833797-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org --- target/arm/helper.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- target/arm/internals.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- target/arm/ptw.c | 8 +------- 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index d7f578f2ba..dde64a487a 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -4473,6 +4473,24 @@ typedef struct { uint64_t length; } TLBIRange; +static ARMGranuleSize tlbi_range_tg_to_gran_size(int tg) +{ + /* + * Note that the TLBI range TG field encoding differs from both + * TG0 and TG1 encodings. + */ + switch (tg) { + case 1: + return Gran4K; + case 2: + return Gran16K; + case 3: + return Gran64K; + default: + return GranInvalid; + } +} + static TLBIRange tlbi_aa64_get_range(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmuidx, uint64_t value) { @@ -4481,17 +4499,19 @@ static TLBIRange tlbi_aa64_get_range(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmuidx, uint64_t select = sextract64(value, 36, 1); ARMVAParameters param = aa64_va_parameters(env, select, mmuidx, true); TLBIRange ret = { }; + ARMGranuleSize gran; page_size_granule = extract64(value, 46, 2); + gran = tlbi_range_tg_to_gran_size(page_size_granule); /* The granule encoded in value must match the granule in use. */ - if (page_size_granule != (param.using64k ? 3 : param.using16k ? 2 : 1)) { + if (gran != param.gran) { qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "Invalid tlbi page size granule %d\n", page_size_granule); return ret; } - page_shift = (page_size_granule - 1) * 2 + 12; + page_shift = arm_granule_bits(gran); num = extract64(value, 39, 5); scale = extract64(value, 44, 2); exponent = (5 * scale) + 1; @@ -10375,7 +10395,7 @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool data) { uint64_t tcr = regime_tcr(env, mmu_idx); - bool epd, hpd, using16k, using64k, tsz_oob, ds; + bool epd, hpd, tsz_oob, ds; int select, tsz, tbi, max_tsz, min_tsz, ps, sh; ARMGranuleSize gran; ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env); @@ -10419,11 +10439,9 @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, } gran = sanitize_gran_size(cpu, gran, stage2); - using64k = gran == Gran64K; - using16k = gran == Gran16K; if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_st, cpu)) { - max_tsz = 48 - using64k; + max_tsz = 48 - (gran == Gran64K); } else { max_tsz = 39; } @@ -10433,7 +10451,7 @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, * adjust the effective value of DS, as documented. */ min_tsz = 16; - if (using64k) { + if (gran == Gran64K) { if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_lva, cpu)) { min_tsz = 12; } @@ -10442,14 +10460,14 @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, switch (mmu_idx) { case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2: case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S: - if (using16k) { + if (gran == Gran16K) { ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16_2_lpa2, cpu); } else { ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4_2_lpa2, cpu); } break; default: - if (using16k) { + if (gran == Gran16K) { ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16_lpa2, cpu); } else { ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4_lpa2, cpu); @@ -10486,10 +10504,9 @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, .tbi = tbi, .epd = epd, .hpd = hpd, - .using16k = using16k, - .using64k = using64k, .tsz_oob = tsz_oob, .ds = ds, + .gran = gran, }; } diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h index 6166ac0a98..9566364dca 100644 --- a/target/arm/internals.h +++ b/target/arm/internals.h @@ -1007,6 +1007,26 @@ typedef enum ARMGranuleSize { GranInvalid, } ARMGranuleSize; +/** + * arm_granule_bits: Return address size of the granule in bits + * + * Return the address size of the granule in bits. This corresponds + * to the pseudocode TGxGranuleBits(). + */ +static inline int arm_granule_bits(ARMGranuleSize gran) +{ + switch (gran) { + case Gran64K: + return 16; + case Gran16K: + return 14; + case Gran4K: + return 12; + default: + g_assert_not_reached(); + } +} + /* * Parameters of a given virtual address, as extracted from the * translation control register (TCR) for a given regime. @@ -1019,10 +1039,9 @@ typedef struct ARMVAParameters { bool tbi : 1; bool epd : 1; bool hpd : 1; - bool using16k : 1; - bool using64k : 1; bool tsz_oob : 1; /* tsz has been clamped to legal range */ bool ds : 1; + ARMGranuleSize gran : 2; } ARMVAParameters; ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va, diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c index ddacffa7ee..23f16f4ff7 100644 --- a/target/arm/ptw.c +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c @@ -1062,13 +1062,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address, } } - if (param.using64k) { - stride = 13; - } else if (param.using16k) { - stride = 11; - } else { - stride = 9; - } + stride = arm_granule_bits(param.gran) - 3; /* * Note that QEMU ignores shareability and cacheability attributes, From 915f62844cf62e428c7c178149b5ff1cbe129b07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Maydell Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 17:23:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 28/28] docs/system/arm/emulation.rst: Report FEAT_GTG support FEAT_GTG is a change tho the ID register ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 so that it can report a different set of supported granule (page) sizes for stage 1 and stage 2 translation tables. As of commit c20281b2a5048 we already report the granule sizes that way for '-cpu max', and now we also correctly make attempts to use unimplemented granule sizes fail, so we can report the support of the feature in the documentation. Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell Message-id: 20221003162315.2833797-4-peter.maydell@linaro.org --- docs/system/arm/emulation.rst | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst index be7bbffe59..cfb4b0768b 100644 --- a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst +++ b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ the following architecture extensions: - FEAT_FRINTTS (Floating-point to integer instructions) - FEAT_FlagM (Flag manipulation instructions v2) - FEAT_FlagM2 (Enhancements to flag manipulation instructions) +- FEAT_GTG (Guest translation granule size) - FEAT_HCX (Support for the HCRX_EL2 register) - FEAT_HPDS (Hierarchical permission disables) - FEAT_I8MM (AArch64 Int8 matrix multiplication instructions)