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target/arm: Fix multiline comment syntax 

Since commit 8c06fbdf36 checkpatch.pl enforce a new multiline
comment syntax. Since we'll move this code around, fix its style
first.

Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20190701132516.26392-8-philmd@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2019-07-01 17:26:20 +01:00 committed by Peter Maydell
parent 2c8ec397f8
commit 9a223097e4
3 changed files with 196 additions and 98 deletions
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237
target/arm/helper.c
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@ -7529,7 +7529,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op)
{
/* The TT instructions can be used by unprivileged code, but in
/*
* The TT instructions can be used by unprivileged code, but in
* user-only emulation we don't have the MPU.
* Luckily since we know we are NonSecure unprivileged (and that in
* turn means that the A flag wasn't specified), all the bits in the
@ -7801,7 +7802,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_write(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t addr, uint32_t value,
return true;
pend_fault:
/* By pending the exception at this point we are making
/*
* By pending the exception at this point we are making
* the IMPDEF choice "overridden exceptions pended" (see the
* MergeExcInfo() pseudocode). The other choice would be to not
* pend them now and then make a choice about which to throw away
@ -7876,7 +7878,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_read(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t *dest, uint32_t addr,
return true;
pend_fault:
/* By pending the exception at this point we are making
/*
* By pending the exception at this point we are making
* the IMPDEF choice "overridden exceptions pended" (see the
* MergeExcInfo() pseudocode). The other choice would be to not
* pend them now and then make a choice about which to throw away
@ -7977,7 +7980,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_preserve_fp_state)(CPUARMState *env)
*/
}
/* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit for the specified security bank.
/*
* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit for the specified security bank.
* This may change the current stack pointer between Main and Process
* stack pointers if it is done for the CONTROL register for the current
* security state.
@ -8005,7 +8009,8 @@ static void write_v7m_control_spsel_for_secstate(CPUARMState *env,
}
}
/* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit. This may change the current
/*
* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit. This may change the current
* stack pointer between Main and Process stack pointers.
*/
static void write_v7m_control_spsel(CPUARMState *env, bool new_spsel)
@ -8015,7 +8020,8 @@ static void write_v7m_control_spsel(CPUARMState *env, bool new_spsel)
void write_v7m_exception(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t new_exc)
{
/* Write a new value to v7m.exception, thus transitioning into or out
/*
* Write a new value to v7m.exception, thus transitioning into or out
* of Handler mode; this may result in a change of active stack pointer.
*/
bool new_is_psp, old_is_psp = v7m_using_psp(env);
@ -8041,7 +8047,8 @@ static void switch_v7m_security_state(CPUARMState *env, bool new_secstate)
return;
}
/* All the banked state is accessed by looking at env->v7m.secure
/*
* All the banked state is accessed by looking at env->v7m.secure
* except for the stack pointer; rearrange the SP appropriately.
*/
new_ss_msp = env->v7m.other_ss_msp;
@ -8068,7 +8075,8 @@ static void switch_v7m_security_state(CPUARMState *env, bool new_secstate)
void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
{
/* Handle v7M BXNS:
/*
* Handle v7M BXNS:
* - if the return value is a magic value, do exception return (like BX)
* - otherwise bit 0 of the return value is the target security state
*/
@ -8083,7 +8091,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
}
if (dest >= min_magic) {
/* This is an exception return magic value; put it where
/*
* This is an exception return magic value; put it where
* do_v7m_exception_exit() expects and raise EXCEPTION_EXIT.
* Note that if we ever add gen_ss_advance() singlestep support to
* M profile this should count as an "instruction execution complete"
@ -8108,7 +8117,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
{
/* Handle v7M BLXNS:
/*
* Handle v7M BLXNS:
* - bit 0 of the destination address is the target security state
*/
@ -8121,7 +8131,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
assert(env->v7m.secure);
if (dest & 1) {
/* target is Secure, so this is just a normal BLX,
/*
* Target is Secure, so this is just a normal BLX,
* except that the low bit doesn't indicate Thumb/not.
*/
env->regs[14] = nextinst;
@ -8152,7 +8163,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
env->regs[13] = sp;
env->regs[14] = 0xfeffffff;
if (arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env)) {
/* Write a dummy value to IPSR, to avoid leaking the current secure
/*
* Write a dummy value to IPSR, to avoid leaking the current secure
* exception number to non-secure code. This is guaranteed not
* to cause write_v7m_exception() to actually change stacks.
*/
@ -8167,7 +8179,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
static uint32_t *get_v7m_sp_ptr(CPUARMState *env, bool secure, bool threadmode,
bool spsel)
{
/* Return a pointer to the location where we currently store the
/*
* Return a pointer to the location where we currently store the
* stack pointer for the requested security state and thread mode.
* This pointer will become invalid if the CPU state is updated
* such that the stack pointers are switched around (eg changing
@ -8213,7 +8226,8 @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc, bool targets_secure,
mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(env, targets_secure, true);
/* We don't do a get_phys_addr() here because the rules for vector
/*
* We don't do a get_phys_addr() here because the rules for vector
* loads are special: they always use the default memory map, and
* the default memory map permits reads from all addresses.
* Since there's no easy way to pass through to pmsav8_mpu_lookup()
@ -8244,7 +8258,8 @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc, bool targets_secure,
return true;
load_fail:
/* All vector table fetch fails are reported as HardFault, with
/*
* All vector table fetch fails are reported as HardFault, with
* HFSR.VECTTBL and .FORCED set. (FORCED is set because
* technically the underlying exception is a MemManage or BusFault
* that is escalated to HardFault.) This is a terminal exception,
@ -8276,7 +8291,8 @@ static uint32_t v7m_integrity_sig(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t lr)
static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
bool ignore_faults)
{
/* For v8M, push the callee-saves register part of the stack frame.
/*
* For v8M, push the callee-saves register part of the stack frame.
* Compare the v8M pseudocode PushCalleeStack().
* In the tailchaining case this may not be the current stack.
*/
@ -8327,7 +8343,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
return true;
}
/* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. A write failure may
/*
* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. A write failure may
* cause us to pend a derived exception.
*/
sig = v7m_integrity_sig(env, lr);
@ -8351,7 +8368,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
bool ignore_stackfaults)
{
/* Do the "take the exception" parts of exception entry,
/*
* Do the "take the exception" parts of exception entry,
* but not the pushing of state to the stack. This is
* similar to the pseudocode ExceptionTaken() function.
*/
@ -8376,13 +8394,15 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) &&
(lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK)) {
/* The background code (the owner of the registers in the
/*
* The background code (the owner of the registers in the
* exception frame) is Secure. This means it may either already
* have or now needs to push callee-saves registers.
*/
if (targets_secure) {
if (dotailchain && !(lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_ES_MASK)) {
/* We took an exception from Secure to NonSecure
/*
* We took an exception from Secure to NonSecure
* (which means the callee-saved registers got stacked)
* and are now tailchaining to a Secure exception.
* Clear DCRS so eventual return from this Secure
@ -8391,7 +8411,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
lr &= ~R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK;
}
} else {
/* We're going to a non-secure exception; push the
/*
* We're going to a non-secure exception; push the
* callee-saves registers to the stack now, if they're
* not already saved.
*/
@ -8413,14 +8434,16 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
lr |= R_V7M_EXCRET_SPSEL_MASK;
}
/* Clear registers if necessary to prevent non-secure exception
/*
* Clear registers if necessary to prevent non-secure exception
* code being able to see register values from secure code.
* Where register values become architecturally UNKNOWN we leave
* them with their previous values.
*/
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
if (!targets_secure) {
/* Always clear the caller-saved registers (they have been
/*
* Always clear the caller-saved registers (they have been
* pushed to the stack earlier in v7m_push_stack()).
* Clear callee-saved registers if the background code is
* Secure (in which case these regs were saved in
@ -8441,7 +8464,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
}
if (push_failed && !ignore_stackfaults) {
/* Derived exception on callee-saves register stacking:
/*
* Derived exception on callee-saves register stacking:
* we might now want to take a different exception which
* targets a different security state, so try again from the top.
*/
@ -8458,7 +8482,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
return;
}
/* Now we've done everything that might cause a derived exception
/*
* Now we've done everything that might cause a derived exception
* we can go ahead and activate whichever exception we're going to
* take (which might now be the derived exception).
*/
@ -8661,7 +8686,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
static bool v7m_push_stack(ARMCPU *cpu)
{
/* Do the "set up stack frame" part of exception entry,
/*
* Do the "set up stack frame" part of exception entry,
* similar to pseudocode PushStack().
* Return true if we generate a derived exception (and so
* should ignore further stack faults trying to process
@ -8729,7 +8755,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_stack(ARMCPU *cpu)
}
}
/* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. If we fail a stack
/*
* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. If we fail a stack
* write this will result in a derived exception being pended
* (which may be taken in preference to the one we started with
* if it has higher priority).
@ -8846,7 +8873,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
bool ftype;
bool restore_s16_s31;
/* If we're not in Handler mode then jumps to magic exception-exit
/*
* If we're not in Handler mode then jumps to magic exception-exit
* addresses don't have magic behaviour. However for the v8M
* security extensions the magic secure-function-return has to
* work in thread mode too, so to avoid doing an extra check in
@ -8860,7 +8888,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
return;
}
/* In the spec pseudocode ExceptionReturn() is called directly
/*
* In the spec pseudocode ExceptionReturn() is called directly
* from BXWritePC() and gets the full target PC value including
* bit zero. In QEMU's implementation we treat it as a normal
* jump-to-register (which is then caught later on), and so split
@ -8893,7 +8922,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
}
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
/* EXC_RETURN.ES validation check (R_SMFL). We must do this before
/*
* EXC_RETURN.ES validation check (R_SMFL). We must do this before
* we pick which FAULTMASK to clear.
*/
if (!env->v7m.secure &&
@ -8907,7 +8937,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
}
if (env->v7m.exception != ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI) {
/* Auto-clear FAULTMASK on return from other than NMI.
/*
* Auto-clear FAULTMASK on return from other than NMI.
* If the security extension is implemented then this only
* happens if the raw execution priority is >= 0; the
* value of the ES bit in the exception return value indicates
@ -8932,7 +8963,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
/* still an irq active now */
break;
case 1:
/* we returned to base exception level, no nesting.
/*
* We returned to base exception level, no nesting.
* (In the pseudocode this is written using "NestedActivation != 1"
* where we have 'rettobase == false'.)
*/
@ -8949,7 +8981,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
/* UNPREDICTABLE if S == 1 or DCRS == 0 or ES == 1 (R_XLCP);
/*
* UNPREDICTABLE if S == 1 or DCRS == 0 or ES == 1 (R_XLCP);
* we choose to take the UsageFault.
*/
if ((excret & R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK) ||
@ -8968,7 +9001,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
break;
case 13: /* Return to Thread using Process stack */
case 9: /* Return to Thread using Main stack */
/* We only need to check NONBASETHRDENA for v7M, because in
/*
* We only need to check NONBASETHRDENA for v7M, because in
* v8M this bit does not exist (it is RES1).
*/
if (!rettobase &&
@ -9026,7 +9060,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
}
if (ufault) {
/* Bad exception return: instead of popping the exception
/*
* Bad exception return: instead of popping the exception
* stack, directly take a usage fault on the current stack.
*/
env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_INVPC_MASK;
@ -9056,7 +9091,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
switch_v7m_security_state(env, return_to_secure);
{
/* The stack pointer we should be reading the exception frame from
/*
* The stack pointer we should be reading the exception frame from
* depends on bits in the magic exception return type value (and
* for v8M isn't necessarily the stack pointer we will eventually
* end up resuming execution with). Get a pointer to the location
@ -9129,7 +9165,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
v7m_stack_read(cpu, &xpsr, frameptr + 0x1c, mmu_idx);
if (!pop_ok) {
/* v7m_stack_read() pended a fault, so take it (as a tail
/*
* v7m_stack_read() pended a fault, so take it (as a tail
* chained exception on the same stack frame)
*/
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...derived exception on unstacking\n");
@ -9137,7 +9174,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
return;
}
/* Returning from an exception with a PC with bit 0 set is defined
/*
* Returning from an exception with a PC with bit 0 set is defined
* behaviour on v8M (bit 0 is ignored), but for v7M it was specified
* to be UNPREDICTABLE. In practice actual v7M hardware seems to ignore
* the lsbit, and there are several RTOSes out there which incorrectly
@ -9155,13 +9193,15 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
}
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
/* For v8M we have to check whether the xPSR exception field
/*
* For v8M we have to check whether the xPSR exception field
* matches the EXCRET value for return to handler/thread
* before we commit to changing the SP and xPSR.
*/
bool will_be_handler = (xpsr & XPSR_EXCP) != 0;
if (return_to_handler != will_be_handler) {
/* Take an INVPC UsageFault on the current stack.
/*
* Take an INVPC UsageFault on the current stack.
* By this point we will have switched to the security state
* for the background state, so this UsageFault will target
* that state.
@ -9276,7 +9316,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
frameptr += 0x40;
}
}
/* Undo stack alignment (the SPREALIGN bit indicates that the original
/*
* Undo stack alignment (the SPREALIGN bit indicates that the original
* pre-exception SP was not 8-aligned and we added a padding word to
* align it, so we undo this by ORing in the bit that increases it
* from the current 8-aligned value to the 8-unaligned value. (Adding 4
@ -9302,13 +9343,15 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
V7M_CONTROL, SFPA, sfpa);
}
/* The restored xPSR exception field will be zero if we're
/*
* The restored xPSR exception field will be zero if we're
* resuming in Thread mode. If that doesn't match what the
* exception return excret specified then this is a UsageFault.
* v7M requires we make this check here; v8M did it earlier.
*/
if (return_to_handler != arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env)) {
/* Take an INVPC UsageFault by pushing the stack again;
/*
* Take an INVPC UsageFault by pushing the stack again;
* we know we're v7M so this is never a Secure UsageFault.
*/
bool ignore_stackfaults;
@ -9330,7 +9373,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu)
{
/* v8M security extensions magic function return.
/*
* v8M security extensions magic function return.
* We may either:
* (1) throw an exception (longjump)
* (2) return true if we successfully handled the function return
@ -9360,7 +9404,8 @@ static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu)
frame_sp_p = get_v7m_sp_ptr(env, true, threadmode, spsel);
frameptr = *frame_sp_p;
/* These loads may throw an exception (for MPU faults). We want to
/*
* These loads may throw an exception (for MPU faults). We want to
* do them as secure, so work out what MMU index that is.
*/
mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate(env, true);
@ -9441,7 +9486,8 @@ static void arm_log_exception(int idx)
static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
uint32_t addr, uint16_t *insn)
{
/* Load a 16-bit portion of a v7M instruction, returning true on success,
/*
* Load a 16-bit portion of a v7M instruction, returning true on success,
* or false on failure (in which case we will have pended the appropriate
* exception).
* We need to do the instruction fetch's MPU and SAU checks
@ -9464,7 +9510,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
v8m_security_lookup(env, addr, MMU_INST_FETCH, mmu_idx, &sattrs);
if (!sattrs.nsc || sattrs.ns) {
/* This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a
/*
* This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a
* region boundary with the second half not being S&NSC.
*/
env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_INVEP_MASK;
@ -9494,7 +9541,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
{
/* Check whether this attempt to execute code in a Secure & NS-Callable
/*
* Check whether this attempt to execute code in a Secure & NS-Callable
* memory region is for an SG instruction; if so, then emulate the
* effect of the SG instruction and return true. Otherwise pend
* the correct kind of exception and return false.
@ -9503,7 +9551,8 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx;
uint16_t insn;
/* We should never get here unless get_phys_addr_pmsav8() caused
/*
* We should never get here unless get_phys_addr_pmsav8() caused
* an exception for NS executing in S&NSC memory.
*/
assert(!env->v7m.secure);
@ -9521,7 +9570,8 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
}
if (insn != 0xe97f) {
/* Not an SG instruction first half (we choose the IMPDEF
/*
* Not an SG instruction first half (we choose the IMPDEF
* early-SG-check option).
*/
goto gen_invep;
@ -9532,13 +9582,15 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
}
if (insn != 0xe97f) {
/* Not an SG instruction second half (yes, both halves of the SG
/*
* Not an SG instruction second half (yes, both halves of the SG
* insn have the same hex value)
*/
goto gen_invep;
}
/* OK, we have confirmed that we really have an SG instruction.
/*
* OK, we have confirmed that we really have an SG instruction.
* We know we're NS in S memory so don't need to repeat those checks.
*/
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...really an SG instruction at 0x%08" PRIx32
@ -9567,8 +9619,10 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
arm_log_exception(cs->exception_index);
/* For exceptions we just mark as pending on the NVIC, and let that
handle it. */
/*
* For exceptions we just mark as pending on the NVIC, and let that
* handle it.
*/
switch (cs->exception_index) {
case EXCP_UDEF:
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, env->v7m.secure);
@ -9614,13 +9668,15 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
break;
case EXCP_PREFETCH_ABORT:
case EXCP_DATA_ABORT:
/* Note that for M profile we don't have a guest facing FSR, but
/*
* Note that for M profile we don't have a guest facing FSR, but
* the env->exception.fsr will be populated by the code that
* raises the fault, in the A profile short-descriptor format.
*/
switch (env->exception.fsr & 0xf) {
case M_FAKE_FSR_NSC_EXEC:
/* Exception generated when we try to execute code at an address
/*
* Exception generated when we try to execute code at an address
* which is marked as Secure & Non-Secure Callable and the CPU
* is in the Non-Secure state. The only instruction which can
* be executed like this is SG (and that only if both halves of
@ -9633,7 +9689,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
}
break;
case M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT:
/* Various flavours of SecureFault for attempts to execute or
/*
* Various flavours of SecureFault for attempts to execute or
* access data in the wrong security state.
*/
switch (cs->exception_index) {
@ -9675,7 +9732,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS, false);
break;
default:
/* All other FSR values are either MPU faults or "can't happen
/*
* All other FSR values are either MPU faults or "can't happen
* for M profile" cases.
*/
switch (cs->exception_index) {
@ -9741,7 +9799,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
lr = R_V7M_EXCRET_RES1_MASK |
R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK;
/* The S bit indicates whether we should return to Secure
/*
* The S bit indicates whether we should return to Secure
* or NonSecure (ie our current state).
* The ES bit indicates whether we're taking this exception
* to Secure or NonSecure (ie our target state). We set it
@ -9776,7 +9835,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
v7m_exception_taken(cpu, lr, false, ignore_stackfaults);
}
/* Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch64 register set with AArch32
/*
* Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch64 register set with AArch32
* register set. This is necessary when switching between AArch32 and AArch64
* execution state.
*/
@ -9790,7 +9850,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env)
env->xregs[i] = env->regs[i];
}
/* Unless we are in FIQ mode, x8-x12 come from the user registers r8-r12.
/*
* Unless we are in FIQ mode, x8-x12 come from the user registers r8-r12.
* Otherwise, they come from the banked user regs.
*/
if (mode == ARM_CPU_MODE_FIQ) {
@ -9803,7 +9864,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env)
}
}
/* Registers x13-x23 are the various mode SP and FP registers. Registers
/*
* Registers x13-x23 are the various mode SP and FP registers. Registers
* r13 and r14 are only copied if we are in that mode, otherwise we copy
* from the mode banked register.
*/
@ -9858,7 +9920,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env)
env->xregs[23] = env->banked_r13[bank_number(ARM_CPU_MODE_UND)];
}
/* Registers x24-x30 are mapped to r8-r14 in FIQ mode. If we are in FIQ
/*
* Registers x24-x30 are mapped to r8-r14 in FIQ mode. If we are in FIQ
* mode, then we can copy from r8-r14. Otherwise, we copy from the
* FIQ bank for r8-r14.
*/
@ -9877,7 +9940,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_32_to_64(CPUARMState *env)
env->pc = env->regs[15];
}
/* Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch32 register set with AArch64
/*
* Function used to synchronize QEMU's AArch32 register set with AArch64
* register set. This is necessary when switching between AArch32 and AArch64
* execution state.
*/
@ -9891,7 +9955,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_64_to_32(CPUARMState *env)
env->regs[i] = env->xregs[i];
}
/* Unless we are in FIQ mode, r8-r12 come from the user registers x8-x12.
/*
* Unless we are in FIQ mode, r8-r12 come from the user registers x8-x12.
* Otherwise, we copy x8-x12 into the banked user regs.
*/
if (mode == ARM_CPU_MODE_FIQ) {
@ -9904,7 +9969,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_64_to_32(CPUARMState *env)
}
}
/* Registers r13 & r14 depend on the current mode.
/*
* Registers r13 & r14 depend on the current mode.
* If we are in a given mode, we copy the corresponding x registers to r13
* and r14. Otherwise, we copy the x register to the banked r13 and r14
* for the mode.
@ -9915,7 +9981,8 @@ void aarch64_sync_64_to_32(CPUARMState *env)
} else {
env->banked_r13[bank_number(ARM_CPU_MODE_USR)] = env->xregs[13];
/* HYP is an exception in that it does not have its own banked r14 but
/*
* HYP is an exception in that it does not have its own banked r14 but
* shares the USR r14
*/
if (mode == ARM_CPU_MODE_HYP) {
@ -12758,7 +12825,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t reg)
return value;
}
case 0x94: /* CONTROL_NS */
/* We have to handle this here because unprivileged Secure code
/*
* We have to handle this here because unprivileged Secure code
* can read the NS CONTROL register.
*/
if (!env->v7m.secure) {
@ -12811,7 +12879,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t reg)
return env->v7m.faultmask[M_REG_NS];
case 0x98: /* SP_NS */
{
/* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
/*
* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
* currently in handler mode or not, using the NS CONTROL.SPSEL.
*/
bool spsel = env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SPSEL_MASK;
@ -12862,7 +12931,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t reg)
void HELPER(v7m_msr)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t maskreg, uint32_t val)
{
/* We're passed bits [11..0] of the instruction; extract
/*
* We're passed bits [11..0] of the instruction; extract
* SYSm and the mask bits.
* Invalid combinations of SYSm and mask are UNPREDICTABLE;
* we choose to treat them as if the mask bits were valid.
@ -12948,7 +13018,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_msr)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t maskreg, uint32_t val)
return;
case 0x98: /* SP_NS */
{
/* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
/*
* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
* currently in handler mode or not, using the NS CONTROL.SPSEL.
*/
bool spsel = env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SPSEL_MASK;
@ -13109,7 +13180,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op)
bool targetsec = env->v7m.secure;
bool is_subpage;
/* Work out what the security state and privilege level we're
/*
* Work out what the security state and privilege level we're
* interested in is...
*/
if (alt) {
@ -13126,12 +13198,14 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op)
/* ...and then figure out which MMU index this is */
mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(env, targetsec, targetpriv);
/* We know that the MPU and SAU don't care about the access type
/*
* We know that the MPU and SAU don't care about the access type
* for our purposes beyond that we don't want to claim to be
* an insn fetch, so we arbitrarily call this a read.
*/
/* MPU region info only available for privileged or if
/*
* MPU region info only available for privileged or if
* inspecting the other MPU state.
*/
if (arm_current_el(env) != 0 || alt) {
@ -13236,7 +13310,8 @@ bool arm_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int size,
void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in)
{
/* Implement DC ZVA, which zeroes a fixed-length block of memory.
/*
* Implement DC ZVA, which zeroes a fixed-length block of memory.
* Note that we do not implement the (architecturally mandated)
* alignment fault for attempts to use this on Device memory
* (which matches the usual QEMU behaviour of not implementing either
@ -13249,7 +13324,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in)
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
{
/* Slightly awkwardly, QEMU's TARGET_PAGE_SIZE may be less than
/*
* Slightly awkwardly, QEMU's TARGET_PAGE_SIZE may be less than
* the block size so we might have to do more than one TLB lookup.
* We know that in fact for any v8 CPU the page size is at least 4K
* and the block size must be 2K or less, but TARGET_PAGE_SIZE is only
@ -13276,7 +13352,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in)
}
}
if (i == maxidx) {
/* If it's all in the TLB it's fair game for just writing to;
/*
* If it's all in the TLB it's fair game for just writing to;
* we know we don't need to update dirty status, etc.
*/
for (i = 0; i < maxidx - 1; i++) {
@ -13285,7 +13362,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in)
memset(hostaddr[i], 0, blocklen - (i * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE));
return;
}
/* OK, try a store and see if we can populate the tlb. This
/*
* OK, try a store and see if we can populate the tlb. This
* might cause an exception if the memory isn't writable,
* in which case we will longjmp out of here. We must for
* this purpose use the actual register value passed to us
@ -13301,7 +13379,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in)
}
}
/* Slow path (probably attempt to do this to an I/O device or
/*
* Slow path (probably attempt to do this to an I/O device or
* similar, or clearing of a block of code we have translations
* cached for). Just do a series of byte writes as the architecture
* demands. It's not worth trying to use a cpu_physical_memory_map(),

54
target/arm/op_helper.c
View File

@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ static inline uint32_t merge_syn_data_abort(uint32_t template_syn,
{
uint32_t syn;
/* ISV is only set for data aborts routed to EL2 and
/*
* ISV is only set for data aborts routed to EL2 and
* never for stage-1 page table walks faulting on stage 2.
*
* Furthermore, ISV is only set for certain kinds of load/stores.
@ -112,7 +113,8 @@ static inline uint32_t merge_syn_data_abort(uint32_t template_syn,
syn = syn_data_abort_no_iss(same_el,
ea, 0, s1ptw, is_write, fsc);
} else {
/* Fields: IL, ISV, SAS, SSE, SRT, SF and AR come from the template
/*
* Fields: IL, ISV, SAS, SSE, SRT, SF and AR come from the template
* syndrome created at translation time.
* Now we create the runtime syndrome with the remaining fields.
*/
@ -144,14 +146,16 @@ void arm_deliver_fault(ARMCPU *cpu, vaddr addr, MMUAccessType access_type,
if (target_el == 2 || arm_el_is_aa64(env, target_el) ||
arm_s1_regime_using_lpae_format(env, arm_mmu_idx)) {
/* LPAE format fault status register : bottom 6 bits are
/*
* LPAE format fault status register : bottom 6 bits are
* status code in the same form as needed for syndrome
*/
fsr = arm_fi_to_lfsc(fi);
fsc = extract32(fsr, 0, 6);
} else {
fsr = arm_fi_to_sfsc(fi);
/* Short format FSR : this fault will never actually be reported
/*
* Short format FSR : this fault will never actually be reported
* to an EL that uses a syndrome register. Use a (currently)
* reserved FSR code in case the constructed syndrome does leak
* into the guest somehow.
@ -194,7 +198,8 @@ void arm_cpu_do_unaligned_access(CPUState *cs, vaddr vaddr,
arm_deliver_fault(cpu, vaddr, access_type, mmu_idx, &fi);
}
/* arm_cpu_do_transaction_failed: handle a memory system error response
/*
* arm_cpu_do_transaction_failed: handle a memory system error response
* (eg "no device/memory present at address") by raising an external abort
* exception
*/
@ -970,7 +975,8 @@ static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
int bt;
uint32_t contextidr;
/* Links to unimplemented or non-context aware breakpoints are
/*
* Links to unimplemented or non-context aware breakpoints are
* CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE: either behave as if disabled, or
* as if linked to an UNKNOWN context-aware breakpoint (in which
* case DBGWCR<n>_EL1.LBN must indicate that breakpoint).
@ -989,7 +995,8 @@ static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
bt = extract64(bcr, 20, 4);
/* We match the whole register even if this is AArch32 using the
/*
* We match the whole register even if this is AArch32 using the
* short descriptor format (in which case it holds both PROCID and ASID),
* since we don't implement the optional v7 context ID masking.
*/
@ -1006,7 +1013,8 @@ static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
case 9: /* linked VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
case 11: /* linked context ID and VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
default:
/* Links to Unlinked context breakpoints must generate no
/*
* Links to Unlinked context breakpoints must generate no
* events; we choose to do the same for reserved values too.
*/
return false;
@ -1020,7 +1028,8 @@ static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool is_wp)
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
uint64_t cr;
int pac, hmc, ssc, wt, lbn;
/* Note that for watchpoints the check is against the CPU security
/*
* Note that for watchpoints the check is against the CPU security
* state, not the S/NS attribute on the offending data access.
*/
bool is_secure = arm_is_secure(env);
@ -1034,7 +1043,8 @@ static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool is_wp)
}
cr = env->cp15.dbgwcr[n];
if (wp->hitattrs.user) {
/* The LDRT/STRT/LDT/STT "unprivileged access" instructions should
/*
* The LDRT/STRT/LDT/STT "unprivileged access" instructions should
* match watchpoints as if they were accesses done at EL0, even if
* the CPU is at EL1 or higher.
*/
@ -1048,7 +1058,8 @@ static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool is_wp)
}
cr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[n];
}
/* The WATCHPOINT_HIT flag guarantees us that the watchpoint is
/*
* The WATCHPOINT_HIT flag guarantees us that the watchpoint is
* enabled and that the address and access type match; for breakpoints
* we know the address matched; check the remaining fields, including
* linked breakpoints. We rely on WCR and BCR having the same layout
@ -1116,7 +1127,8 @@ static bool check_watchpoints(ARMCPU *cpu)
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
int n;
/* If watchpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
/*
* If watchpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
* exceptions here then watchpoint firings are ignored.
*/
if (extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 15, 1) == 0
@ -1137,7 +1149,8 @@ static bool check_breakpoints(ARMCPU *cpu)
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
int n;
/* If breakpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
/*
* If breakpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
* exceptions here then breakpoint firings are ignored.
*/
if (extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 15, 1) == 0
@ -1164,7 +1177,8 @@ void HELPER(check_breakpoints)(CPUARMState *env)
bool arm_debug_check_watchpoint(CPUState *cs, CPUWatchpoint *wp)
{
/* Called by core code when a CPU watchpoint fires; need to check if this
/*
* Called by core code when a CPU watchpoint fires; need to check if this
* is also an architectural watchpoint match.
*/
ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
@ -1177,7 +1191,8 @@ vaddr arm_adjust_watchpoint_address(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr, int len)
ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
/* In BE32 system mode, target memory is stored byteswapped (on a
/*
* In BE32 system mode, target memory is stored byteswapped (on a
* little-endian host system), and by the time we reach here (via an
* opcode helper) the addresses of subword accesses have been adjusted
* to account for that, which means that watchpoints will not match.
@ -1196,7 +1211,8 @@ vaddr arm_adjust_watchpoint_address(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr, int len)
void arm_debug_excp_handler(CPUState *cs)
{
/* Called by core code when a watchpoint or breakpoint fires;
/*
* Called by core code when a watchpoint or breakpoint fires;
* need to check which one and raise the appropriate exception.
*/
ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
@ -1220,7 +1236,8 @@ void arm_debug_excp_handler(CPUState *cs)
uint64_t pc = is_a64(env) ? env->pc : env->regs[15];
bool same_el = (arm_debug_target_el(env) == arm_current_el(env));
/* (1) GDB breakpoints should be handled first.
/*
* (1) GDB breakpoints should be handled first.
* (2) Do not raise a CPU exception if no CPU breakpoint has fired,
* since singlestep is also done by generating a debug internal
* exception.
@ -1231,7 +1248,8 @@ void arm_debug_excp_handler(CPUState *cs)
}
env->exception.fsr = arm_debug_exception_fsr(env);
/* FAR is UNKNOWN: clear vaddress to avoid potentially exposing
/*
* FAR is UNKNOWN: clear vaddress to avoid potentially exposing
* values to the guest that it shouldn't be able to see at its
* exception/security level.
*/

3
target/arm/vfp_helper.c
View File

@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ void HELPER(vfp_set_fpscr)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t val)
set_default_nan_mode(dnan_enabled, &env->vfp.fp_status_f16);
}
/* The exception flags are ORed together when we read fpscr so we
/*
* The exception flags are ORed together when we read fpscr so we
* only need to preserve the current state in one of our
* float_status values.
*/