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linux-user: handle /proc/$$ like /proc/self 

Some applications use /proc/$$/... (where $$ is the own pid) instead of
/proc/self/... to refer to their own proc files.  Extend the interception
for open and readlink to handle this case.  Also, do the same interception
in readlinkat.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Andreas Schwab 2013-07-02 14:04:12 +01:00 committed by Riku Voipio
parent ab8bf29078
commit 463d8e7393
1 changed files with 46 additions and 19 deletions
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65
linux-user/syscall.c
View File

@ -4973,6 +4973,30 @@ static int open_self_auxv(void *cpu_env, int fd)
return 0; return 0;
} }
static int is_proc_myself(const char *filename, const char *entry)
{
if (!strncmp(filename, "/proc/", strlen("/proc/"))) {
filename += strlen("/proc/");
if (!strncmp(filename, "self/", strlen("self/"))) {
filename += strlen("self/");
} else if (*filename >= '1' && *filename <= '9') {
char myself[80];
snprintf(myself, sizeof(myself), "%d/", getpid());
if (!strncmp(filename, myself, strlen(myself))) {
filename += strlen(myself);
} else {
return 0;
}
} else {
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(filename, entry)) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int do_open(void *cpu_env, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode) static int do_open(void *cpu_env, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
{ {
struct fake_open { struct fake_open {
@ -4981,15 +5005,14 @@ static int do_open(void *cpu_env, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
}; };
const struct fake_open *fake_open; const struct fake_open *fake_open;
static const struct fake_open fakes[] = { static const struct fake_open fakes[] = {
{ "/proc/self/maps", open_self_maps }, { "maps", open_self_maps },
{ "/proc/self/stat", open_self_stat }, { "stat", open_self_stat },
{ "/proc/self/auxv", open_self_auxv }, { "auxv", open_self_auxv },
{ NULL, NULL } { NULL, NULL }
}; };
for (fake_open = fakes; fake_open->filename; fake_open++) { for (fake_open = fakes; fake_open->filename; fake_open++) {
if (!strncmp(pathname, fake_open->filename, if (is_proc_myself(pathname, fake_open->filename)) {
strlen(fake_open->filename))) {
break; break;
} }
} }
@ -6262,20 +6285,18 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
#endif #endif
case TARGET_NR_readlink: case TARGET_NR_readlink:
{ {
void *p2, *temp; void *p2;
p = lock_user_string(arg1); p = lock_user_string(arg1);
p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg2, arg3, 0); p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg2, arg3, 0);
if (!p || !p2) if (!p || !p2) {
ret = -TARGET_EFAULT; ret = -TARGET_EFAULT;
else { } else if (is_proc_myself((const char *)p, "exe")) {
if (strncmp((const char *)p, "/proc/self/exe", 14) == 0) { char real[PATH_MAX], *temp;
char real[PATH_MAX]; temp = realpath(exec_path, real);
temp = realpath(exec_path,real); ret = temp == NULL ? get_errno(-1) : strlen(real) ;
ret = (temp==NULL) ? get_errno(-1) : strlen(real) ; snprintf((char *)p2, arg3, "%s", real);
snprintf((char *)p2, arg3, "%s", real); } else {
} ret = get_errno(readlink(path(p), p2, arg3));
else
ret = get_errno(readlink(path(p), p2, arg3));
} }
unlock_user(p2, arg2, ret); unlock_user(p2, arg2, ret);
unlock_user(p, arg1, 0); unlock_user(p, arg1, 0);
@ -6287,10 +6308,16 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
void *p2; void *p2;
p = lock_user_string(arg2); p = lock_user_string(arg2);
p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg3, arg4, 0); p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg3, arg4, 0);
if (!p || !p2) if (!p || !p2) {
ret = -TARGET_EFAULT; ret = -TARGET_EFAULT;
else } else if (is_proc_myself((const char *)p, "exe")) {
char real[PATH_MAX], *temp;
temp = realpath(exec_path, real);
ret = temp == NULL ? get_errno(-1) : strlen(real) ;
snprintf((char *)p2, arg4, "%s", real);
} else {
ret = get_errno(readlinkat(arg1, path(p), p2, arg4)); ret = get_errno(readlinkat(arg1, path(p), p2, arg4));
}
unlock_user(p2, arg3, ret); unlock_user(p2, arg3, ret);
unlock_user(p, arg2, 0); unlock_user(p, arg2, 0);
} }